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Foreword from the Publisher  
 
The recognition of the rising role of geography in international politics 
calls for deeper and more frequent research in geopolitics. This book 
fits into this new major trend and attempts to add a new research topic 
to the literature. While the media and the academic research in 
geopolitics are mostly focusing on the major powers, the periphery and 
small countries among great powers has remained almost invisible. The 
common endeavour of the studies in this book is to challenge this 
traditional view by introducing the readers to the major characteristics 
of the peripheries and smaller states. A group of studies provides 
examples of how peripheral geographical conditions affect countries 
and manifest themselves in the elite’s strategic choices and decision-
making processes. Other studies introduce the reader to how great 
power competition in different regions is emerging in a multipolar 
international system, forcing smaller countries into asymmetric 
relations with great powers. Finally, there are studies arguing that the 
periphery can be defined on different spatial levels, while the problems 
have different meanings for these layers. Besides its academic value, 
the book also provides opportunities for young researchers related to 
the Department of Geography, Geoeconomy and Sustainable 
Development (Geo Department) at Corvinus University of Budapest to 
publish part of their research results. The Geo Department is committed 
to reach a wide range of readers interested in geopolitics, global affairs 
and sustainable development, including different expert groups, future 
professionals, and the general public. We hope that this book can be 
the first step in forming a new generation of geopolitical books that will 
represent the importance of this research approach in order to guide 




Géza Salamin  
Head, CUB GEO Department 
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The Return of Geopolitics and Global Peripheries 
Viktor Eszterhai 
 
After the Cold War, in the so-called unipolar moment, the United 
States focused on trade liberalisation, nuclear non-proliferation, the 
rule of law, human rights, war against terrorism, climate change, and so 
on. The ideological triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the new 
world order suggested that old-fashioned geopolitics will never return 
because in the time of globalisation, the zero-sum mentality has 
become outdated. In today’s interconnected and interdependent 
world, geopolitics has simply lost its sense: nation-states as analytical 
units and the competition on controlling territory have become far less 
relevant.  
However, there is no doubt that in recent years, a re-emergence of 
geopolitics can be observed. First, there is a rise of hard power and great 
power competition – including the direct use of military power in a 
more multi-polarised international order. China, Russia, or Iran as rising 
powers are openly challenging the US’s leading position, that is its 
desperate attempts to maintain the status quo. Initiatives concerning 
the unification of Eurasia (the Eurasian Economic Union or the Belt and 
Road Initiative), or the counter “Rimlands” strategy of the Trump 
administration all contain clear geopolitical elements and provide new 
geopolitical narratives for the future. New alliances are being formed 
(e.g. between Russia and China), while proxy wars (e.g. in Syria, Ukraine, 
or Yemen) have globally intensified. Furthermore, protectionism and 
the resurgence of inward-looking politics clearly challenge the previous 
architecture of global leadership. Consensual norms and globally 
accepted standards are being questioned and the force of globalisation 
long believed to be irreversible, with the setback in the growth of global 
trade following the 2007 financial crisis, has been widely considered as 
the end of a global phenomenon. Trade wars and the rejection of 
multilateralism are fragmenting global interconnectivity, which 
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parallelly makes the major economic centres (China, the USA, and the 
European Union) less dependent on each other and more dominant 
within their regions. “Sticks” (economic warfare) and “carrots” 
(economic incentives with deeper regional economic cooperation) are 
widely used by the great powers to enlarge their sphere of influence. 
Finally, geopolitics has strongly reappeared in the discourse of state 
leaders and popular media, increasingly making use of geopolitical 
concepts to understand and analyse global events. The long-avoided 
word has become part of the mainstream vocabulary. 
In the new era, with the return of geopolitics, much attention is 
focused on the core powers, while the periphery in which the great 
power competitions are often manifested are less visible. Peripheries 
have a significantly weaker ability to amass and project power and they 
are often seen as a mere theatre of operations. However, from a 
geopolitical point of view, these regions are far from being irrelevant. 
First, this type of space is crucial since great powers will neither collide 
head-on, nor on their own territory. Therefore, achieving and 
maintaining – material and psychological – control over these regions 
are crucial for the great powers in their strategies (e.g. when a 
peripheral country becomes a major supplier of critical commodities for 
the bigger power). Thus, when a major power identifies a state or a 
region in the periphery as strategically important to its goals, the former 
geopolitical relevance increases. As an answer, the peripheral state 
must decide whether to support or to resist the great powers: balancing 
or bandwagoning are the classical relevant strategies. Active 
participation in global issues and forums further increases the 
geopolitical relevance of a peripheral region or country. Consequently, 
peripheries are geopolitically important and relevant to investigate 
their dynamics.  
The ambition of the present collection of studies is to introduce the 
reader to some of the special cases of geopolitics on the periphery. Even 
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though the topics are intentionally varied, with wide regional focus, the 
reader can recognise similar patterns within the chapters. 
Fitting into this trend, the first chapter, Ádám Csenger’s study 
entitled the “Rivalry between Australia and China in the Pacific Islands” 
highlights the rarely investigated Pacific Islands (the Micronesian, 
Melanesian, and Polynesian islands) region’s intense rivalry between 
the traditional great power Australia and the newcomer China. China’s 
growing presence in the region inclines the smaller countries to rethink 
their long-standing partnership with Australia, while the rivalry among 
these major powers can turn into an economically favourable situation 
for the region. 
Ráchel Czirják’s study entitled the “Neo-colonialist efforts in Africa 
in the light of EU–African and Chinese–African relations” focuses on the 
neo-colonisation strategies of the European Union and China. The 
former has the colonial legacy, while the latter is controversially 
portrayed either as the saviour of the continent or the enslaver of 
Africa. The paper argues that history repeats itself and due to neo-
colonialism, the African region is integrated into the global structures in 
a dependent way, making the convergence to the global centres 
impossible. 
Murat Deregözü’s paper the “Geographical Complexities of Turkey 
in the Post-Cold War Era” investigates the new directions of Turkish 
foreign policy in the increasingly multipolar international order. With 
the Arab Spring, new geopolitical challenges have risen in the Middle 
East, combined with new actors in the region, and the country, which 
belonged to the Western bloc during the Cold War area, has to answer 
stressing questions about its identity, alliance system and so on. Even 
though Turkey identifies itself as a regional middle-power, diffuse 
values and diverse interests often characterize peripheries. 
The chapter by Zoltán Megyesi and Éva Beáta Corey entitled 
“Romania: A Pragmatic Buffer State between East and West” argues 
that Romania is considered a typical buffer state from a geopolitical 
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perspective since it has been at the forefront of great powers’ interests. 
Romania fits well into the classical example when the role of a 
peripheral country is increasing because its geographical location is 
crucial to the great powers in their strategies. Although there are 
several impediment factors, the country’s geopolitical weight is growing 
since it plays a key role in the power aspirations of Euro-Atlantic powers, 
especially the United States, to contain Russia.  
Ádám Róma’s chapter entitled „Geopolitics and Environmental 
Consequences of Water Scarcity in the Peripheries of China and India” 
investigates the peripheral borderland of two emerging great powers, 
China and India. The Hindu Kush Himalayan (HKH) region is one of the 
most remote spots on Earth from one point of view, but at the same 
time, it is playing an indispensable role in global climate and weather 
patterns, and it also hosts a multi-coloured “ethnoscape” between the 
Himalayan mountains and valleys. This paper, therefore, compares 
three distinct perspectives of the global environmental, the great 
power, and the local level, arguing that these different scales are crucial 
not only to understanding the interrelationship between them, but the 
complex interdependence of the peripheries on their environment. 
Hnin Mya Thida’s study entitled “Stuck Between Great Powers: The 
Myitsone Dilemma and the Challenge of the NLD Government” 
investigates the classical asymmetric relationship between the 
peripheral Myanmar and China. In 2015, the political picture of 
Myanmar changed when the military government turned over power to 
a semi-civil government with immense policy changes taking place both 
in domestic affairs and foreign policy alignment. The new government 
in its foreign relation tried to reduce the dependence on China and 
balance more between great powers. The case study of the Myitsone 
Dam project, however, shows the limits of this balancing strategy for 
the periphery. 
Finally, Wang Renxin’s study entitled “The Fundamental Principle 
of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Balance of Power” examines the once 
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poor and insignificant Singapore’s foreign political strategy, balancing, 
which it has pursued for decades. The study argues that balancing has 
not only influenced Singapore’s foreign policy making to this day, but 




Rivalry Between Australia and China in the Pacific Islands 
Ádám Csenger 
 
The Pacific Islands (the Micronesian, Melanesian and Polynesian 
islands) extend over 303,000 square kilometres of land (80% of which is 
Papua New Guinea) in an area of 52 million square kilometres of the 
Pacific Ocean (Brown, 2012, p. 3). The region’s islands (of which the 14 
independent states are relevant to this analysis: the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Cook Islands 
and Niue) are at a disadvantage in several aspects. Their areas and 
populations are small, they have few natural resources (minerals in 
large amounts are only to be found in Papua New Guinea; the leading 
export items in the other countries are fish, wood, and coconut palm 
products, among others [The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
2019]), are located far from the main economic and commercial 
centres, and are among the countries most vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change and worst affected by natural disasters in the world (The 
World Bank, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 1: The five largest Pacific island countries by population (2018 
estimates). Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2019. 
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Figure 2: The five largest Pacific island countries by area.  
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2019. 
 
Figure 3: GDP per capita of the five largest Pacific island countries 
(2017 estimates). Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2019. 
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Australia and the Pacific Region 
 
Owing to its relative proximity, the region is considered by Australia 
part of its natural sphere of influence. It is of strategic importance to 
Australia because it is in the country’s interest that the Pacific be stable 
in terms of economy, politics and security. This is in line with Australia’s 
overall geopolitical objectives which focus on stability: as a major 
beneficiary of free trade and the rules-based global order, its national 
interest is the preservation of the current status quo both in its 
immediate region and in Asia. Australia relies on the US, its long-
standing ally, to protect the status quo in Southeast and East Asia from 
China’s disruptive actions (Morris, 2018), whereas in the Pacific Islands 
it considers maintaining stability and promoting development its own 
duty. 
Australia has supported Pacific Island countries’ sustainable 
development through both bilateral and regional programs and has 
worked closely with them to develop their law and order, border 
security, and economic management. The region’s most important 
organisation is the Pacific Islands Forum (Brown, 2012, p. 1-4), which 
includes Australia as one of its 18 members (Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, 2019). The significance of the Pacific to Australia is 
demonstrated by the fact that it has sent troops and police to quell 
unrest in the region on several occasions: in 1999 to East Timor, in 2003 
to Solomon Islands, and in 2006 again to East Timor and Solomon 
Islands as well as Tonga (Brown, 2012, p. 2). 
Australia became the region’s leading power after the islands 
gained independence from British colonial rule in the 1970s. Building 
upon the experience of World War II, Australia’s main priority during 
the Cold War was to prevent a potentially hostile power from 
establishing a military base in the region, which would pose a threat to 
Australia. With the end of the Cold War, this threat was over and 
Australian influence was limited to granting aid to the region’s 
countries; however, its terms – e.g. that beneficiary states should try to 
decrease their dependence on Australian aid – created the impression 
that the territory was essentially a burden for Australia (Brown, 2012, 
p. 5-6). 
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After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Australia decided to support the 
region’s weaker sates more actively in order to avoid their possible 
collapse, which would potentially allow terrorist and criminal 
organisations posing a threat to Australia to gain ground in the region. 
The country, in this spirit, participated (as the mission’s leader and key 
financer) in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
between 2003 and 2017, which aimed to restore the chaos-struck 
Solomon Islands (which had seen a period of civil unrest from 1998 
onwards that the government could not cope with) into a functional 
state (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2019). 
In recent years, the Pacific has again appeared in a new light in 
Australia owing to the significant growth of China’s influence in the 
region. The government recognised the significance of the situation in 
2018, in part likely due to news surfacing in April that year about 
discussions between Vanuatu and China regarding the establishment of 
a Chinese military base on the island. The news was discredited by both 
countries; however, the possibility of a Chinese military base in the 
region gave rise to concerns in Australia since it would mean a direct 
military threat to the country (“Aust worried about Chinese military 
base”, 2018). 
 
China’s Presence in the Region 
 
In order to understand China’s presence in the Pacific Islands, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss its geopolitics in general. In contrast to its 
mostly restrained and peaceful development from the 1980s to the late 
2000s (characterised by the principle of “hiding our capabilities and 
biding our time”), from the 2010s China has been increasingly assertive 
internationally. Several factors have driven this change: America’s 
declared “pivot to Asia” under President Barack Obama, Japan’s 
perceived efforts to expand its military capabilities, and continuing 
American and allied military and other activities in areas close to China 
have contributed to the Chinese perception that the US and its allies 
and partners are attempting to contain China. Another factor is the rise 
of nationalism in China, particularly since Xi Jinping became president 
in 2012. As a result, the public and the government no longer want to 
“hide and bide” and instead believe that China should claim its rightful 
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position in the world as a superpower (Gill & Jakobson, 2017, p. 149-
153). Naturally, being a superpower involves having a global presence, 
including in the Pacific region. 
China has been providing financial assistance to the Pacific since 
1990. One of its goals is to marginalise Taiwan diplomatically: there has 
been a rivalry between the two countries in which they expect the 
island states to establish diplomatic relations (and thereby not 
recognise the rival party) in exchange for financial assistance (Brant, 
2015, p. 1). China’s aid to the region began to sharply increase in 2006: 
it was this year when China organised the first China-Pacific Island 
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, where it 
promised greater support to the eight countries with which it has 
diplomatic relations (Dayant & Pryke, 2018) (Taiwan has diplomatic ties 
with six states in the region [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of 
China (Taiwan), 2019]). Since then, China’s presence in the area has 
increased spectacularly: Chinese public companies build and restore 
roads, conference centres, ports and airports, Chinese fishing vessels 
operate in its waters (“Australia is battling China for influence in the 
Pacific”, 2019), a Chinese “floating hospital” ship visits the region’s ports 
(except for those countries which recognise Taiwan, of course) 
(Bainbridge, 2018), and Fiji has received a hydrographic and surveillance 
vessel from China as a gift (Panda, 2018). 
Debates are going on all over the world about whether Chinese 
public loans granted to many developing countries lead to these states 
having unsustainable debt. This is also true for the Pacific region. Critics 
say that Chinese aid is not transparent and likely contains unfavourable 
terms for the affected countries (the agreements are classified, hence 
the term “likely”). In January 2018, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, the 
Australian Minister for International Development at the time made an 
unusually open remark, saying that China invests in pointless 
infrastructure developments in the region, which, moreover, lead to 
unsustainable debts for the affected island states (Graue & Dziedzic, 
2018). In mid-2018, former Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop also 
expressed criticism about the increased Chinese activity. Her statement 
that Australia, as the region’s main development partner, prefers 
investment that does not make local communities seriously indebted, 
did not mention China explicitly, but clearly referred to it (Dziedzic, 
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2018). Responding to the criticisms, China states that its aid is always 
“sincere and unselfish” and, before granting loans, strict economic and 
technical evaluations are conducted to establish the beneficiary’s ability 
of paying its debt back (Dziedzic, 2018). 
There is much uncertainty and misunderstanding surrounding the 
extent and goals of China’s aid programs in the Pacific. This is partly due 
to a lack of information: China does not publish detailed information 
about the grants, and neither do the island states in many cases (Lowy 
Institute, 2018c). Some basic facts, thus, have to be pointed out. The 
assumption that Chinese support provided to the region is growing 
might seem to be logical due to the increasing Chinese influence, but 
examining the data suggests otherwise. According to a detailed analysis 
conducted by Australian think tank Lowy Institute in 2018, between 
2011 and 2018 the amount of both the promised and the actually spent 
Chinese support varied greatly, rather than increasing linearly. The fact 
that the largest share of the region’s support by far comes from 
Australia also makes the situation more complex. Between 2011 and 
2017, the country provided USD 6.58 bn to the region (no data is 
available for 2018 yet) compared to China with USD 1.26 bn (including 
2018) (Lowy Institute, 2018b). (Australian and New Zealand aid 
combined accounts for 55% of support for the region [Lowy Institute, 
2018].) China, moreover, promises much more aid than it actually 
provides: until early 2019 it disbursed only USD 1.26 bn out of 5.88 bn 
it promised between 2011 and 2018 (Australia pledged USD 6.72 bn 
between 2011 and 2017 and granted 6.58 bn). In 2017, China promised 
an exceptionally high amount of aid of USD 4 bn; however, the value of 
the assistance actually provided in 2017 and 2018 totalled only USD 210 
mn (Lowy Institute, 2018b). 
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Figure 4: The biggest aid donors in the Pacific Islands between 
2011-2018 (data about Australia is for 2011-2017). Source: Lowy 
Institute, 2018b. 
 
Estimates by the Lowy Institute show that 70% of Chinese aid 
consists of concessional loans (Dziedzic, 2018) (Australian aid, in 
contrast, is entirely made up of donations [Fox & Dornan, 2018]). The 
effectiveness of the use of Chinese aid is questionable, since, in line with 
Beijing's preferences, it is typically used to realise spectacular projects 
and infrastructure investments which demonstrate China’s regional 
presence (Dziedzic, 2018) (as opposed to projects financed via 
Australian and New Zealand support, which on average are one-tenth 
the size of Chinese projects [Lowy Institute, 2018a]). In addition to 
individual countries, China also provides aid to the major regional 
organisations, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in particular (Brant, 
2015, p. 1). 
In order to better assess Chinese aid, it is worth examining it in 
Vanuatu and Tonga, the two countries where Chinese money plays 





Chinese presence has been apparent in Vanuatu for years: one can 
find Chinese-built government buildings, stadiums, conference centres, 
roads, etc. on its islands; the landing strip of the Port Vila airport was 
extended with Chinese money, and the port on Santo Island, opened in 
2017, was also built by China (the contractual terms of its building 
sparked off intense debate, which will be explained below). Australian 
concerns, caused by news in 2018 that China intends to establish a 
military base in Vanuatu and use the Santo Island port for military 
purposes too, are therefore not without reason. (This anxiety is likely 
increased by the fact that Vanuatu, despite its official neutrality as a 
member of the Non-Aligned Movement, was the first Pacific country to 
side with China in the South China Sea disputes [Bohane, 2018].) 
The port on Santo Island is one of the central elements of the 
debate over whether the states in the Pacific are becoming trapped in 
debt because of China. Many draw a parallel between the port on Santo 
Island and that of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which was built by the Sri 
Lankan state from Chinese credit. Being unable to repay the loan, the 
country leased the port to a Chinese-owned company for 99 years in 
2017 in return for decreasing the credit (Marlow, 2018). 
The Santo Island port, opened in August 2017, was built by the 
Chinese Shanghai Construction Group Co. Ltd. Many Australian officers 
and experts believe that the agreement between the company and 
Vanuatu is unfavourable for the island state, since China could get hold 
of the port in case of insolvency, as was the case with the port of 
Hambantota. In order to prove Vanuatu’s ability to repay the loan and 
that the agreement does not contain a debt-for-equity swap (that is, 
China cannot obtain the port), the Foreign Minister of Vanuatu, Ralph 
Regenvanu published the contract on the construction of the port, 
concluded with the Chinese EXIM Bank. The published contract indeed 
does not contain a debt-for-equity swap. Experts say, however, that the 
contract clearly favours China in case of insolvency. Japan has granted 
a loan to Vanuatu for a similar port and the discrepancies between the 
terms of the two credits stand out: the grace period of the Japanese 
loan is 10 years, while that of the Chinese loan is 5 years; the interest 
on the Japanese loan is 0.55% as opposed to 2.5% on the Chinese credit; 
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the repayment schedule of the Japanese loan is 40 years, compared to 
15 years of the Chinese credit. In an event of default, China can recover 
the whole amount in one sum, the contract is entirely governed by 
Chinese laws, and a possible arbitration would take place in the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (CIETAC). It 
therefore seems that even if the contract does not contain a debt-for-
equity swap, it clearly favours China over Vanuatu. However, it should 
also be noted that the 30% debt-to-GDP ratio (half of the debt is owed 
to China, while the other half mainly to the Asian Development Bank) of 
the island state is not uncommon in the region (Bohane, 2018), and the 
risk of debt distress is moderate according to an IMF report 




Chinese aid may be the most apparent in Tonga in the Pacific 
region. The island state received two major cheap loans from China (in 
2008 and 2010), which were partly used to restore the business quarter 
of the capital, Nukuʻalofa following the riots in 2006 (Fox, 2018). The 
two loans are worth around USD 160 mn (Dziedzic, 2018), which is 
equivalent to 64% of Tonga’s public debt, which, in turn, constitutes 
43% of the GDP (Brant, 2015). It is not clear, in light of this, whether 
Tonga will be able to repay the loan (Fox, 2018). The government has 
been asking China to waive the debt for years in vain (Fox, 2018). The 
country would have started to repay the loans in late 2018, but Prime 
Minister Akilisi Pohiva said the repayment would have been difficult, so 
he publicly asked the other regional states taking out a Chinese loan to 
jointly request China to waive their debts (Dziedzic, 2018). Eventually, 
in November 2018, Tonga joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) and thereby received a five-year extension to the loans’ grace 
period (“Tonga gets five years’ grace on Chinese loan as Pacific nation 
joins Belt and Road initiative”, 2018). 
Overall, it is appropriate to speak of a debt trap in the case of 
Tonga, although the country was granted a five-year extension to repay 
the loan. The claims of a debt trap, however, are unsubstantiated in the 
case of Vanuatu, along with the other countries of the Pacific region: 
although, based on the risk ratings by the IMF and the Asian 
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Development Bank, debt distress has increased in the region over the 
past five years (over 40% of the region’s countries have a high-risk 
rating), half of the countries worst affected by this issue have not 
received a Chinese loan (since they have diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
they are not eligible anyway), and Chinese loans account for only less 
than half of the total credit in each of these countries, with the 
exception of Tonga. Chinese loans (which constitute around 12% of the 
region’s total debt) have also flowed into countries where debt 
repayment does not represent a problem (Fox & Dornan, 2018). 
Aside from the unsubstantiated Chinese debt trap claim, however, 
it is undeniable that China is increasingly present in the Pacific. The 
country appears to have several objectives in the Pacific Islands: it 
wants to expand its economic presence; marginalise Taiwan; increase 
its influence in order to gain political support in regional and 
international matters; challenge Western dominance in the region and 
test how far it can go in doing so; and possibly lay the groundwork for 
future military bases (Garrick, 2018). Australia (as it will be explained 
below) aims to halt the growing Chinese influence by strengthening and 
extending its ties with the region – but this effort is complicated by the 
fact that its relations with the island states are not free from tensions. 
 
Tensions Between Australia and the Pacific Region 
 
The island states believe that Australia often patronises them in an 
arrogant way, reminding them of its great power status and not treating 
them as equal partners. Therefore, Australian Prime Minister Scott 
Morrison, who took office in August 2018, made an unfortunate 
decision when he did not attend the Pacific Islands Forum meeting held 
just a couple days after his appointment, because he reinforced the 
regional countries’ feeling that Australia often regards them as 
important partners only in its rhetoric (Easterly, 2018). This also seems 
to be supported by the infrequency of leading Australian politicians 
visiting the region: before Scott Morrison’s visit in January 2019, 
Australian prime ministers had not visited Vanuatu and Fiji since 1990 
and 2006, respectively (“Australia is battling China for influence in the 
Pacific”, 2019). However, this has been changing since the “waking up” 
of the Australian government in 2018. In the first weeks of 2019, in 
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addition to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Assistant 
Minister for the Pacific, the Chief of the Defence Force and the 
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police also visited the region 
(Whiting & Dziedzic, 2019). 
Australia’s attitude towards climate change is also problematic for 
the Pacific island nations. Climate change is of vital significance to the 
region’s countries as the sea level rise caused by global warming 
threatens their very existence and they can hardly protect themselves 
from the ever more frequent natural disasters induced by climate 
change. However, the conservative Australian government coalition, in 
power since 2013, has an ambivalent stance on how much Australia – 
which has the world’s eleventh largest ecological footprint according to 
the 2018 data of the Global Footprint Network (Global Footprint 
Network, 2018) – should contribute to the global fight against climate 
change. As a matter of fact, Scott Morrison became prime minister 
thanks to the fact that his predecessor had become a victim of a coup 
within his own party because its conservative wing was unwilling to 
accept that the government would introduce a law that restricted 
greenhouse gas emissions (Yaxley, 2018). Thus, although Australia 
signed a treaty established at the meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum 
in autumn 2018 that identified climate change as the number one 
priority of the Pacific, this probably did not release the doubts of the 
island nations over Australia’s commitment (McLeod, 2018). 
During the term of the current Australian government, a major 
convergence of the parties’ positions is not expected; however, the 
Australian government has made significant efforts since early 2018 to 
strengthen and extend its existing relations with the region in other 
areas. 
 
Australia’s Actions Against Chinese Influence 
 
In the 2018-2019 budget, the Australian government allocated 
record high, AUD 1.3 bn support to the Pacific. The growing significance 
of the region is reflected by the fact that while this amount is AUD 200 
mn more than the previous 1.1 bn, Australia’s total foreign assistance 
budget remained AUD 4.2 bn. With its increased amount, the Pacific 
region now accounts for 30% of the foreign aid budget (Fox, 2018). 
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The supported projects include laying an underwater internet cable 
connecting Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea with Australia, 
which will be realised by an Australian company through a public grant 
worth around AUD 137 mn (the entire project costs AUD 170 mn) 
(Armbruster, 2018). Solomon Islands originally agreed with Huawei in 
2016 that it would lay a cable which ensures connectivity with Australia; 
however, Australia informed the island state in 2017 that since it 
considers Huawei a national security risk because of its alleged 
connections to the Chinese government, the cable would most likely not 
be authorised to join the Australian internet network. Australia then 
proposed that the planned internet cable connecting Papua New 
Guinea and Australia could be extended to Solomon Islands and 
Australia would undertake the majority of costs. The island nation 
eventually chose Australia instead of Huawei for the project (Fox, 2018). 
Australia has “overtaken” China on another occasion as well. 
Instead of China, the country will finance the upgrade of the Blackrock 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Camp on 
Fiji, which the Fiji government hopes will become the region’s training 
centre. The trainings here will be held by the Australian Defence Force, 
thereby deepening the cooperation with the region’s military forces 
(Wallis, 2018). 
The reinforcement of Australia’s regional military position is also 
served by a plan announced in autumn 2018 that Australia, the US and 
Papua New Guinea will jointly upgrade the naval base on Papua New 
Guinea’s Manus Island, which, if necessary, could play a role in US and 
Australian navy operations and enable the permanent military presence 
of these two countries (“APEC: US to aid redevelopment of PNG’s 
Lombrum naval base”, 2018). Due to its vital geographical location, the 
island has played an important role in the defence strategies of the US 
and Australia since World War II (Fazio, 2018), so it is not surprising that, 
given China’s growing influence, both countries deem it necessary to 
involve the base in their efforts to halt the Chinese expansion. Another 
factor that must have played a role in making this decision was that 
China supposedly expressed its interest in upgrading another port on 
Manus Island as well as three other ports in Papua New Guinea (Wallis, 
2018). 
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The projects in Fiji and Papua New Guinea are part of the Defence 
Cooperation Program of the Australian government, which aims to 
promote Australia’s strategic interests by increasing the defence 
capacities of the country’s international partners (for example, in the 
area of illegal fishing or the fight against international crime) and 
establishing close personal relations with regional security partners 
(Australian Government Department of Defence, 2019). Since the 
program is beneficial to all stakeholders, its perception in the Pacific is 
generally positive (Wallis, 2018). Within the program, Australia will 
provide the region’s 13 countries with 21 patrol boats between 2018 
and 2023 (Austal, 2019) as well as with staff and maintenance for 30 
years (Wallis, 2018). 
Another plan, announced at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit in November 2018 by Australia, Papua New Guinea, 
Japan, New Zealand and the US, focuses on infrastructural development 
in the region, and as part of this, these countries will work together to 
provide electricity to 70% of Papua New Guinea’s population (Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019) (the 
current rate is around 13% [Prime Minister of Australia, 2018]). 
Australia, Japan and the US also announced at the APEC summit that 
they had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to work together to 
deliver “principles-based and sustainable” infrastructure development 
in the Indo-Pacific (Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2019) – the wording clearly implies criticism of the 
BRI. 
The significance of the Pacific region was further increased by a 
joint declaration of the Australian Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and 
Defence Minister, issued in November 2018, according to which 
Australia wishes to place a greater emphasis on its relations with the 
region and will therefore take new measures to reinforce security, 
economic, diplomatic and personal relations. The measures include the 
following: 
• Establishing a security college and centre to address gaps in 
training and information sharing in the Pacific 
• Training the region’s police leaders in Australia 
• Creating a Pacific Mobile Training Team within the Australian 
Defence Force 
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• Deploying a dedicated vessel tasked with delivering assistance, 
for example humanitarian aid in the Pacific 
• Creating a fund worth AUD $2 billion to support infrastructure 
development in Pacific countries and Timor-Leste 
• Delivering an extra AUD $1 billion in callable capital to 
Australia’s export financing agency 
• Strengthening sports relations between Australia and the 
Pacific region 
• Opening five new diplomatic missions to have Australian 
diplomatic representation in each of the 18 Pacific Islands 
Forum member states 
• Creating a dedicated branch dealing with the Pacific within the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (Prime Minister of Australia, 
2018). 
 
In addition, all citizens of the region’s countries will be gradually 
granted access to the Pacific Labour Scheme, which was launched in 
mid-2018 to allow certain Pacific states’ citizens to work in Australia’s 
rural areas, and the limit on the number of participants will be abolished 
(Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2019). 
Soft power is an important field of the rivalry between China and 
Australia, and the latter, due to its traditional relations with the region, 
has an advantage over China in this respect, which it can further 
enhance through a well-developed strategy. Some analysts point out 
that as part of these efforts, it would be especially important to bring 
back ABC Radio Australia’s service in the Pacific, which was shut down 
in 2017 – all the more so because the publicly owned China Radio 
International took over some of the unused frequencies since then 





Australia has, for a long time, taken it for granted that the Pacific 
belongs to its sphere of influence. This situation has fundamentally 
changed over the past years. China's growing presence in the region has 
encouraged Australia to take steps towards increasing its own 
influence. Besides financial support, it wishes to build stronger ties with 
the region in many other areas (for example, the cooperation of security 
forces and sport).  
It is worth noting that the US is also increasingly concerned about 
the growing Chinese influence in the Pacific, as demonstrated by a 
report on the assessment of global threats, issued by US intelligence 
services in late January 2019. The report says that China is trying to gain 
the favour of numerous regional countries through bribes, 
infrastructural and other investments, as well as diplomatic relations 
(Stewart, 2019). New Zealand, the region’s other leading power besides 
Australia, also shares the concerns of Australia and the US, therefore 
the New Zealand government announced similar measures to those of 
Australia in 2018 to counterbalance Chinese influence (Novak, 2018). 
Australia and New Zealand together stand a good chance of containing 
China’s influence in the region; however, it is too early to state anything 
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Neo-Colonialist Efforts in Africa in the Light of EU–African 
and Chinese – African Relations 
Ráhel Czirják 
 
Following the dissolution of the bipolar world order and especially 
after the turn of the millennium, the geopolitical landscape has greatly 
diversified: the actors, which were members of either the socialist or 
the capitalist block until 1990, can now follow their own path, so we can 
state that we live in a multipolar world today. Africa is a particularly 
interesting scene of the rise and strengthening of new actors, where – 
after colonisation and the competition for allegiances in the bipolar 
world order – a third scramble is currently under way (Economist, 
2019). Today, however, unlike during the Cold War, economic 
opportunities instead of ideologies are the basis of building relations 
with African states. Nevertheless Africa-policies during the bipolar 
world order were not entirely devoid of economic approaches as well. 
The question is how beneficial these opportunities are to the “dark 
continent”. It is no coincidence that Africa’s recolonization – primarily 
in the wake of China’s spectacular economic growth and its economic 
activities with Africa in this context – is a question often addressed in 
the media, too. Joining this current topic, the present study intends to 
form an opinion about this question on the basis of the theory of neo-
colonialism. To this end, this article first briefly reviews the economic 
aspects of colonisation – as this is essential for understanding the 
concept of neo-colonialism –, and then presents the theory of neo-
colonialism, itself, relying primarily on the work of Kwame Nkrumah, the 
creator of the theory. Finally, it examines EU–African and Chinese–
African relations and seeks an answer as to whether we can speak of 
characteristics of neo-colonialism in these relations. As a result of neo-
colonialism, an economic asymmetry is created, similar to that of the 
colonial era, which recreates Africa’s subjected status, and thus its 
dependency on external actors. Thus, this chapter does not address the 
functioning of the means of neo-colonialism (such as aids, foreign direct 
investments, related political conditions, etc.) – as this would 
considerably exceed its confines –, but looks to the presence of 
economic asymmetry, and thus dependency, created as a result of neo-
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colonialism, based on the trade relations between the areas under 
examination as this is a traditional research instrument which reflects 
dependent relations. The hypothesis states that Africa’s subjection has 
not come to an end with decolonisation. Its role created as a result of 
colonisation has not changed after it became politically independent, 
therefore, there still exist asymmetric economic relations typical of neo-
colonialism in the continent’s relations with both the European Union 
and China. And although the two actors use very different rhetoric 
regarding their relations with Africa, the result is the same: the 
economic subjection of the dark continent and, as a result, the 




Africa’s conquest by external powers fundamentally changed the 
internal social, economic, political, and environmental development 
trends in the continent. Moreover, the consequences of intervention 
are long-term; thus, even after its independence from colonial rule, 
Africa is following essentially the same (development) path that colonial 
powers designated for it. In this chapter, we will briefly review the 
economic consequences of colonisation as the theory and practice of 
neo-colonialism are rooted in these contexts. 
The goal of European colonisation was basically two-fold. On the 
level of political discourse, the major economic powers of the old world 
spoke of Africa’s “civilisation” as a moral, ethical argument justifying 
their conquest. The other and the true goal was the economic 
exploitation of the continent “for the benefit of an industrial economy 
instituted and managed by western Europeans and their allies” (Fage, 
Tordoff, 2004, p. 392). This meant on the one hand the exploitation of 
raw material, and on the other hand, the channelling of the local 
population as a colonial market into Europe’s external trade. 
This latter objective was already reached by colonial powers in the 
period before decolonisation, and it was not threatened by the political 
independence of the continent’s countries as they were intended to 
occupy the same role in the future as well (Geda, 2003). In other words, 
Africa’s economic subjection was created with colonisation and is still 
present today. 
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Colonisation radically changed the former economic status of the 
dark continent and economic trends of the region. In the centuries 
before colonisation, Africa had been characterised by an appropriately 
independent economic system in terms of its relations with other parts 
of the world: the continent produced processed goods which were also 
exported in addition to serving the domestic demand. And the products 
imported from Europe were not targeted to cover basic needs. There 
existed autonomous economic relationships between the continent’s 
both neighbouring and more remote political entities (Austen, 1987; 
Leys 1996; Alemayehu 2002). 
The situation began to change from the turn of the 17th century on, 
when Africa’s economy began to be adjusted to European interests and 
its autonomy was gradually being reduced (Amin, 1972; Rodney, 1972; 
Munro, 1976). There were political and economic-technical reasons 
behind this. By political reasons, we basically mean how the internal 
political processes of individual countries influenced their foreign 
policies related to Africa and to what extent this foreign political activity 
was of a conquering nature and how great impact it had on Africa in the 
light of the countries’ economic and political capacities. By economic–
technical reasons, we mean the industrial revolution, that resulted the 
dramatical increase in the differences of economic and technological 
development between Europe and Africa, and thus the “old continent” 
had tools and methods which enabled it to conquer Africa.  
As a result of these processes, the dark continent gradually lost its 
economic and political autonomy from Europe, and its economic trends 
were increasingly targeted at satisfying European needs. This process 
stopped the African economy in shifting from producing primary 
products to the processing industry. The continent joined the world 
trade dominated by Europeans primarily as a source of raw material and 
food as well as a market outlet of the European processing industry 
(Geda, 2003).  
By the period of high colonialism, the external trade of African 
states was entirely dominated by the parent countries, which entailed, 
at the same time, an almost complete termination of intracontinental 
trade. Capital investments in the colonies could also be realised under 
their control only, serving the interests of the colonisers, and thus they 
were primarily related to export activities (Koncazcki, 1977). 
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Africa’s economic subjection resulted in the continent lagging 
behind in the long-term and being dependent of external financial 
resources. As although the export of raw material provides some 
revenue to a given national economy, most of the profit from basic 
material is realised in developed economies – where added value is 
created through processing –, and which subsequently export their 
manufactured goods to Africa, among others.  
In other words, from an African perspective, not only revenues are 
lower, but expenses are also higher for the continent’s states compared 
to if they had their own processing industry, which could meet domestic 
demand on the one hand, and, on the other hand, produce not raw 
material for the world market but semi-finished or finished products, 
which entail greater revenues. 
After a brief description of the basic economic relations of 
colonisation, the next chapter deals with the theory of neo-colonialism 
through presenting the examination framework of case studies. 
 
The Theory of Neo-Colonialism 
 
Under neo-colonialism, we generally mean external elements’ 
intrusion into nation-states, and thus the violation of national 
sovereignty (Langan, 2018). The creator of the theory is Kwame 
Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana, – which became independent in 
1957 –, who presented his concept in detail in his work entitled Neo-
colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism and published in 1965. The 
analysis primarily relies on his work but other important writings related 
to the theory are Fanon (1961), Sartre (1964), Touré (1962), Nkrumah 
(1963), and Woddis (1967). 
As Nkrumah puts it, neo-colonialism is the continuation of external 
control over Africa’s territory through newer and more sophisticated 
means than those used during the period of colonisation (Nkrumah, 
1965). As a result of this, the intervention into legally independent 
African states reaches an extent, after which they are no longer capable 
of self-governance. Political leadership is determined by foreign actors 
rather than the necessities of local citizens as the African elite 
participating in the neo-colonial system of networks govern along the 
interests of foreign beneficiaries, betraying their own people and 
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preventing any major social or economic development. “The essence of 
neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty. In reality its economic system, and thus its political policy 
is directed from outside.” (Nkrumah, 1965, p. ix). 
Nkrumah basically distinguished two instruments of neo-
colonialism: aids by foreign governments on the one hand, and capital 
investments and economic activities of foreign companies in the 
continent on the other hand (Langan, 2018).  
The former President of Ghana saw aids as a means used by foreign 
powers – the US and former European colonisers – to secure African 
elite groups, rather than a generous effort to help African societies 
(Nkrumah, 1965).  
In his book examining neo-colonialism (Neo-colonialism and the 
poverty of ’development’ in Africa), Mark Langan (2018) provides 
several specific examples, where donors have prevented an economic 
political decision by the government that was undesirable to them or 
bribed the elite through aids or threatened them by revoking aids.  
Another form of and tool for gaining influence by foreign powers 
are the activities carried out by foreign companies in the continent 
inasmuch as they exploit the local workforce and natural resources 
without appropriately contributing to state revenues, job creation, or 
industrialisation (Nkrumah, 1965). This practically is the process 
whereby foreign companies can establish themselves in an African 
country with considerable state concessions and operate without the 
strict labour and environmental standards of the parent country – this 
often leads to inhumane work environments and processes harming the 
environment. The profit produced by companies leaves the investment 
country, and thus it does not have a wider positive effect on the social 
and economic environment. Although the affected African state realises 
some revenue from the transaction through taxes or concession fees, 
the amount of these is insignificant compared to the value of natural 
and human resources drained from the national economy and the 
resulting environmental externalities. 
Regarding the activities of foreign companies, Nkrumah also points 
out that these enterprises sometimes support corrupt African 
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governments and/or finance alternative political elites if they can no 
longer sufficiently control those in power (Nkrumah, 1965).1 
External actors alone cannot conserve the asymmetric economic, 
and thus political situation. In order to maintain the neo-colonial 
system, a two-directional relation is necessary between external and 
internal forces, that is foreign colonisers and representatives of the 
African elite (Nkrumah, 1965).  
Frantz Fanon – a philosopher, Marxist writer, psychiatrist, and 
former Algerian ambassador to Ghana, who had a great influence on 
African thinkers (Encyclopedia Britannica) – also pointed out that 
members of the African elite often collaborate with (former) colonial 
powers, which maintain the asymmetric aid and trade networks with 
the (former) parent country at the expense of their own sovereignty. He 
forecast that these political and economic compromises would keep 
African countries in a subordinate status, which cannot properly 
operate, and thus catch up with Europe or the US (Fanon, 1961).  
In the next sub-chapters, we will examine Africa’s economic and, 
more precisely, trade relations with the European Union and China, 
based on Nkrumah’s concept. A study of all the segments of the 
economy would exceed the length limit of this paper. Trade relations, 
however, appropriately reflect the economic balance – or asymmetry – 
between regions, based on which we can establish whether there is an 
economic subjection typical of neo-colonialism in EU–African and the 
Chinese–African relations. 
 
                                               
1  Nevertheless, it is important to note that Nkrumah did not argue for a 
complete refusal of FDI from developed countries; on the contrary, he openly 
stated that investments from Western powers are welcome if they are directed 
into appropriate segments of industrialisation and if African countries, being 
de facto sovereign, can regulate them in order to increase added value, and 
thus create larger economic profit, which could reduce the economic 
imbalance between the North and the South. (Nkrumah, 1965) In other words, 
foreign companies’ economic activities can even be beneficial to the 
development of African national economies if they are regulated by a de facto 
sovereign government which is independent from outside powers and which 
governs along the interests of the local society (Langan, 2018). 
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EU-African Relations in the Light of Trade 
 
Africa’s trade relation with Europe and the EU within the old 
continent has been institutionalised at a supranational level since the 
very beginning of the EU’s establishment through various trade 
agreements – which has also given rise to concerns of neo-colonialism 
as the theory itself was (partly) a criticism of former European 
colonisers’ foreign political activities following decolonisation. Julius 
Nyerere and Sekou Touré, the first Presidents of Tanzania and Guinea, 
respectively agreed with Kwame Nkrumah that European powers will 
strive to maintain their economic, and thus political influence over 
African countries (Nyerere, 1978; Touré, 1962).  
Provisions on contact with former colonies as well as colonies not 
yet liberated has already been contained in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. 
Afterwards, the economic and trade relations between the EU and 
Africa have been governed by the Yaoundé Conventions, the Lomé 
Conventions, and then the Cotonou Agreement. 2  This sub-chapter 
focuses on the results of these, that is, the current status of the relations 
between Africa and the European Union. 
Based on the total value of trade flow, Africa’s largest trading 
partner is the European Union. After the turn of the millennium, in 
2007, its total trade with the dark continent was worth more than 400 
billion USD, however, the economic crisis caused a massive setback. The 
recession resulted in a decline in demand for African products, and the 
two continent’s trade flow decreased by almost 100 billion USD. After 
2008–2009, there was a moderate growth and by 2011, pre-crisis levels 
in trade flow were reached again and by 2012, the trade flow exceeded 
previous peaks and increased to nearly 430 billion USD (African 
Development Bank, et. al, 2016, p. 79). A similar recession to the 2008 
crisis took place in 2014-2015 due to the drastic fall of the global price 
of oil, however, the EU still clearly stands out from Africa’s other trade 
                                               
2Although the content of the trade agreements will be analysed in another 
study, it is important to note that the hierarchical relation of colonisation was 
still present in the wording of these agreements even after decolonisation as it 
presented Africa as a continent in need of help. This rhetoric has been refined 
over the past decades and the Cotonou Agreement effective today already 
mentions the Dark Continent as a partner. 
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partners. In 2017, their trade flow was again worth more than 300 
billion USD (Eurostat, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 1: Africa’s total trade flows with selected partners and intra-
African, 2000-2015. Source: African Development Bank & OECD 
Development Centre & UNDP (2017). Source: African Economic 
Outlook 2017. p. 86  
 
However, if we consider trade relations from the EU’s perspective, 
we can conclude that Africa’s role is by far not that significant. It has less 
than 10% share of both the exports and imports of the EU’s Member 
States. Exports amounted to 8%, while imports represented 7% in 2017 
(Eurostat, 2019). Contrary to this, the EU’s trade with Asia or the non-
EU-28 countries of the old continent are much more significant, as also 





Figure 2: EU-28 international trade by partner region, value, 2017. 
Source: Eurostat (2019): EU-28 international trade by partner region, 
value, 2017 (%). 
 
In addition to trade flow data, the product structure is also worth 
analysing: while African states primarily export raw material and 
agricultural products, the dark continent imports mostly manufactured 
products from Europe.  
 
 
Figure 3: EU-28 trade in goods with Africa, by product group, 2016 
(billion EUR). Source: Eurostat (2018): Africa-EU – key statistical 
indicators. p. 19.  
 
Based on the latest data available, Europe exports machines and 
transportations means to Africa in the largest volume (37,9%) (Eurostat 
& AU Commission Statistics Division, 2018). Besides this, the share of 
manufactured products (14,4%) and chemicals (13,5%) is also significant 
within Africa’s import from the EU (Eurostat & AU Commission Statistics 
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Division, 2018). The largest share of Africa’s export to the EU-28 
countries are energy products (35,3%), and thus Africa is the EU’s 
second most important source of crude oil after Russia (Eurostat & AU 
Commission Statistics Division, 2018). The second most important 
product group is food and live animals (15.2%), while the third is 
machinery and vehicles (13.8%) (Eurostat & AU Commission Statistics 
Division, 2018). 
Considering all of the above, we can conclude that Africa’s role 
created as a result of colonisation continues to exist nearly half a 
century after decolonisation. Such subjection of the continent 
fundamentally hampers any kind of major economic, and thus social 
development in terms of the improvement of people’s life standards. In 
other words, we can observe economic asymmetry and the subjection 
of the dark continent in terms of EU–African relations. 
 
Chinese–African Relations in the Light of Trade 
 
Contact between China and Africa was already established in the 
15th century when Zheng He’s ships reached the eastern coast of the 
continent, however, official relations were put on a regular basis only 
after 1949, following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. 
The 20-21st-century history of Chinese - African relations can be 
characterised by a distinct shift from their beginning based on 
ideological foundations to pragmatic economic interests (Czirják & 
Polyák & Simigh, 2015).  
In the first decades of the Cold War, China’s main goal was to win 
allies in order to be officially recognised vis-á-vis Taiwan and become a 
permanent member of the UN and take its seat in the Security Council. 
In this period, the key aspect was the number of supporting African 
countries, rather than the economic potential they could offer, for 
instance, through natural resources. When China reached its goal in 
1971, new factors of motivation emerged in its foreign political 
activities, however, after the boost in the early 1970s – for instance in 
the area of aids provided to the dark continent – Africa’s role became 
less significant as a result of the Reform and Opening policy announced 
in 1978 because the Asian country focused its resources on its domestic 
development and growth. This resulted in a stagnation and decrease in 
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the aids provided to Africa in the 1980s (Czirják & Polyák & Simigh, 
2015). 
The relations gained more significance in the late ‘80s and early 
‘90s as a result of the events of 1989 on Tiananmen square, on the one 
hand, – which threatened to internationally isolate China again –, and 
the dissolution of the bipolar world order and the visible successes of 
the Chinese economic model in the ‘90s, on the other hand. The latter 
made China an attractive partner to Africa, and with a stable economic 
background, the country was again able to invest energy into its foreign 
relations (Czirják & Polyák & Simigh, 2015). 
The period after the turn of the millennium has been dominated by 
business relations, and the main organisation in this respect is the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is a ministerial 
meeting organised every three years between China and African 
countries and which has been joined by almost all of the states in the 
dark continent. The Forum is held alternately in Beijing and in one of 
the African capitals. The last Forum was organised in September 2018 
in China. The participating parties define the trends and related budget 
of their cooperation for the next three years (Czirják & Zoltai, 2018). 
China’s rhetoric about its Africa policy differs greatly from that of 
Europe, which has a colonial past. The guiding principles of Chinese – 
African relations date back to as far as 1955, a conference held in 
Bandung, Indonesia, where representative of 23 Asian and 6 Africa 
states met to answer the question: “What role does the third word 
occupy in the Cold War?”. The parties determined the basic principles 
of the relations between them, including the principle of political self-
determination and non-interference into each other’s domestic policies 
(Kende, 1973). 
Regarding the latter principle, China is often criticised by the West 
because in their opinion “Beijing would still not make a distinction 
between regimes, it is willing to do business with anyone and even 
support dictatorships and shows indifference to human rights issues. 
Beijing would readily sell arms to any of the African leaders at a much 
lower price than that offered by Westerners. It does not interfere in the 
internal political (and often ethnic) disputes of states, either.” 
(Engelberth, 2010, p. 11). 
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Another important element of Chinese rhetoric, often emphasised 
during building diplomatic relations with Africa, is that China has never 
acted as a colonising power on the Dark Continent, moreover, it was 
also subject to oppression (Edoho, 2011). Furthermore, the country 
provided considerable support to African states so that they could 
become independent after World War II (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). 
The third important element of China’s rhetoric is that it considers 
itself a developing country, and thus African states are actually equal 
partners, with which it strives to have mutually beneficial relations. 
The limits of this chapter do not allow us to examine how much of 
its rhetoric is actually realised so we can only conclude that its business 
and economic relations with Africa are successful, as confirmed by the 
following statistical data. 
After 2000, Chinese–African relations intensified spectacularly. 
Between 2000 and 2005, Africa’s export to China rose by 48%, which 
meant a 2.5 and 4 times larger growth rate compared to the export into 
the US and the EU, respectively (Broadman, 2008). The Asian country 
increased its trade flow with Africa by more than 20 times in almost one 
and a half decade: while the trade flow was worth less than 10 billion 
USD in 2000 (African Development Bank, et. al, 2015), it has reached 
215 billion USD by 2014 (China-Africa Research Initiative). In this period, 
China’s share of Africa’s total exports was 27%, which was mostly made 
up of raw material (83%) (Pigato & Tang, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: China-Africa trade, 2002-2018, billion USD. Source: China-
Africa Research Initiative: Data: China-Africa Trade.  
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Afterwards, there was a sharp drop in their trade flow, due to the 
decrease of the world market prices of raw material on the one hand, 
and the slow-down of China’s economic growth on the other hand. 
However, by 2018, the total value of trade flow between the two 
regions almost reached the level of 2015 again, while the share of 
export and import changed: Africa’s export to China increased 
compared to 2015 (China-Africa Research Initiative). 
And if we do not count the trade flow of the European Union as one 
amount, China has become Africa’s largest trading partner based on the 
total value of trade flow.  
Based on the goods in the trade flow, we can determine that Africa 
is primarily a source of raw material for China. The latest available data 
show that nearly three-quarters (70%) of the African export to China are 
made up of raw material, and a little bit more than one-quarter (27%) 
is semi-finished products, while the share of finished products is almost 
negligible (2%) (World Bank, 2019). Within raw materials, primarily fuels 
(45%), minerals (18%), and stone and glass (17,8%) are imported to 
China, but the share of metals (11%) is also considerable (World Bank, 
2019).  
As a comparison, the dark continent imports from China mainly 
consumer goods (45%), capital goods (30%), and semi-finished products 
(25%), while the share of raw material is under 1% (World Bank, 2019). 
As for consumer goods, China exports mostly technical goods and 
electronics (25%), as well as textiles and clothing (19%), but the share 





Figure 5: China’s product exports and imports from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2017, (%). Source of data: World Bank (2019). China Product 
exports and imports from Sub-Saharan Africa 2017.  
 
Based on the above information, we get a very similar picture as in 
the case of the EU–African trade structure. In other words, Africa has 
the same economically subjected relation with China as with Europe, 
even though, in line with the basic principles of Chinese foreign policy, 
the Asian country does not wish to exert direct political influence on the 
African party in its business dealings, it does not expect it to 
democratise in return for the transaction, etc. The commercial 
asymmetry is unfavourable to Africa in the long term, although it does 
generate some revenue for the dark continent. Since, with its role as a 
source of raw material and market outlet, its underdeveloped economic 
status is conserved, which prevents it from making major progress. On 
the basis of the above, we can observe an economic asymmetry typical 
of neo-colonialism in Chinese–African relations, which makes further 




Starting from the economic consequences of colonisation on Africa, 
the study addressed the question as to actually how beneficial the 
opportunities offered by the diversity of actors are to Africa today in the 
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multipolar geopolitical space. Regarding the European Union 
comprising traditional colonisers and China, which is a relatively new 
player in the dark continent, the paper wished to answer whether their 
relations with Africa have an economic asymmetry typical of neo-
colonialism in the light of trade partnerships.  
By neo-colonialism, we mean the situation, based on Kwame 
Nkrumah’s definition, in which one or more external powers exerts such 
a great influence on the economy of a de jure independent state that it 
is unable to de facto operate as a sovereign political entity because 
leaders of the national economy govern along the economic interests 
of outside actor(s) rather than those of the local population. And as a 
result of neo-colonialism, the same economic asymmetry is created or 
maintained after decolonisation, which was observed during 
colonisation.  
The study found that both the EU–African relations with a longer 
history and the younger but more intensive Chinese-African relations 
basically lead to the continuation and sustained existence of the 
economic role created by the dark continent’s colonisation. And 
although the two actors’ rhetoric are different due to their distinct 
historical backgrounds, the result of these relationships is the same for 
Africa.  
The dark continent primarily exports raw material (energy 
products, precious metals, and agricultural products) into these regions, 
while its import is dominated by manufactured and consumer goods. 
This situation prevents the processing industry from developing and 
strengthening in the continent, makes Africa vulnerable to the word 
market price volatility of raw material, and preserves over the long term 
its underdeveloped economic status compared to more developed 
regions as the profit created during processing is not realised here but 
the continent has to pay for it through importing manufactured goods 
from more developed economies. This economic subjection poses a 
barrier to any major economic, and thus social progress.  
Based on all of the above, the hypothesis seems to be confirmed. 
However, it is also important to note the limited nature of the study as 
it is not suitable for establishing the actual existence of neo-colonialism. 
In order to do so, one would have to examine how its instruments, such 
as international aid and international capital investments, work with 
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respect to individual countries. The study, however, provides a basis for 
such further research as it has proved that neo-colonialism is still a valid 
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From the time the Ottoman Empire met modern diplomacy until 
the collapse of the empire, three different ideologies prevailed: 
Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. Turkism as an ideology was 
effective in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the very first 
years of the Republic of Turkey (Heper, 2000, pp. 63-82). After the 
collapse of the bipolar system, Turkish foreign policy, which has a long 
institutional history, pursued a pragmatic, rational, and realistic course 
instead of an ideological one. The last period of Ottoman foreign policy 
was based on the status quo and the return to the West 
(Westernization), both technologically and militarily. These two 
principles continued to be effective in the Republic of Turkey’s foreign 
policy, however, neither the status quo nor westernization were 
principles that were blindly followed by the Ottoman Empire and the 
period of the Republic. The collapse of the bipolar system, of which 
USSR was a pole, prompted regional conflicts in the Caucasus, the 
Balkans, and Central Asia. All of these conflicts closely concerned 
Turkey; that is why the most vivid proofs of Turkish involvement, 
interfering in one way or the other in the crisis are; Chechnya, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.  
The acceleration of the globalisation process pushes countries to 
pursue a more open and more dynamic foreign policy. Especially, 
Turkey’s 8th President, Turgut Özal, who first served as Prime Minister 
of Turkey between 1983-89 and subsequently as President between 
1989-93 as a President, pursued a “multidimensional foreign policy” 
(Çınar, 2011). In this way, Turkish foreign policy has become a balanced 
policy between the West, Eurasia and the Middle East. Turkey has 
recently recognised the importance of the re-establishment of 
integration in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Black 
Sea region in terms of its foreign policy interests and maintains a major 
effort to ensure stability in all of these areas. It was not possible to 
pursue an active foreign policy in these regions when the bipolar system 
was dominant. After the collapse of the bipolar system, Turkish foreign 
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policy faced the challenge of taking initiatives in different areas (Daban, 
2017). Since Turkey is geographically part of the region and the great 
waves of immigration in previous centuries created demographic and 
cultural ties with the regions mentioned, Turkey had to pay more 
attention to these areas.  
Following the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy had to act 
and develop original policies that are suitable for a new turn. This 
originality was mentioned in the book, entitled Strategic Depth, by Dr 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s, former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey. According to Davutoğlu’s vision, in the intimate areas 
of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, Turkey should 
develop trustful relations with countries (Davutoğlu, 2008) and, thus, 
Turkey will strengthen its position in the international system. Turkey 
must be aware of its strategic importance in the world, particularly, of 
its proximity to the Middle East, which is one of the world’s most 
troubled areas, but the most important reason is that Turkey could 
reassert its influence on the international system. When it comes to the 
Middle East, Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbours” policy and 
Turkey’s “soft power” approach increased Turkish influence in the 
region and Turkey’s importance in the international system. 
However, the “Zero Problems with Neighbours” lasted only for a 
very short period of time, after which Turkey found itself in a political 
and diplomatic mess in the Middle East due to the competition of 
superpowers. Subsequently, Turkey started to use its proxies in Syria, 
and the military involvement of Turkey in the northern part of Syria was 
inevitable. Additionally, the impact of domestic policy is limited 
compared to that of foreign policy because, in the foreign-domestic 
policy interaction, foreign policy is always decisive for medium-sized 
countries of the international system, such as Turkey. Therefore, if 
Turkey wants to be a strong and stable country in its domestic policies 
and in the international arena, Turkey should be dynamic, an initiator 




Turkey and Its Neighbours 
 
The geography of a country depicts the general framework of the 
country’s applied foreign policies. For example, the United States and 
Britain produce policies with the advantages of the oceans and seas, 
which distinguish them from the strong continental countries of Europe. 
These advantages allow them to maintain long-term foreign policies. 
For Turkey, which is surrounded by different foreign policy cultures, it 
is not easy to define a typical foreign policy profile as other states do 
(Erdağ, 2013). Turkey, in a region surrounded by different strategic 
cultures, must conduct its relations with neighbouring countries which 
have different perceptions and approaches to foreign policy (Erdağ & 
Kardaş, 2012). For instance, it cannot be said that the strategic cultures 
that govern the foreign policies of countries in Europe and the Middle 
East are the same. On the one hand, in the West, international 
relations/foreign policy are based on the legal and institutional 
framework, however, in other regions which surround Turkey, relations 
between countries are depending on Realpolitik principles and take the 
form of power competition. On the one hand, in the West, the group of 
countries use common rules and take into account social norms to 
interact with each other; on the other hand, in the Middle East, there 
are countries that reject and question the common and general 
principles accepted by the international community. In Europe, the 
integration on the basis of economy, law, and cooperation are at the 
forefront, while in the Middle East, concerns over security and 
fragmentation are decisive in developing the countries’ foreign policies. 
While the neighbouring countries of Turkey make such complex policies 
in the region, the difficulties of establishing a coherent foreign policy 
towards these neighbours are clear. 
Turkish foreign policy has been carried out since its foundation in 
the context of the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world”, by 
M. Kemal Ataturk and the principle of having and maintaining good 
relations with neighbours and not interfering in their internal affairs. 
Indeed, Turkey has also made great efforts to implement this policy. 
However, throughout history, if we look at Turkey’s neighbours and 
their relations, there was not a single country where relations run 
smoothly, and they faced several troubles. The 1991 Gulf Crisis, Imia 
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crisis, the Aegean Sea issues, Cyprus and Western Thrace with Greece, 
the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan problems with Syria, which resulted in the 
expulsion of Ocalan from Syria, the crisis of the resolution on the Second 
Gulf War with the United States, and Turkey’s candidacy situation crisis 
with the European Union (EU) are only a few examples.  
It has been a very long story of membership of Turkey in the 
European Union which Turkey is not part of yet. There are several 
milestones of relations between Turkey and the EU. In 1963, Turkey 
signed a partnership agreement with the European Economic 
Community, and three decades later, the Customs Union Agreement 
with the EU followed with full membership negotiations in 2005. 
However, there have always been obstacles to further relations and 
Turkey’s eventual membership. Cyprus is already a member. However, 
there is another dimension which makes ties tighter: the competition 
over the Western Balkans. 
The Balkan Peninsula, as an Ottoman heritage, has been an 
important region for every sort of Turkish governments. Turkey 
supports Western Balkans countries’ aspirations to become EU and 
NATO members (Aydıntaşbaş, 2019). However, with the rise of 
Erdoğan’s AKP, Turkey has initiated stronger ties with its emotional 
hinterland. Turkey not only invests economically in the region but also 
encourages local people to learn Turkish, establishing schools and 
promoting educational activities, renovating cultural centres and 
mosques by using its soft power tools, such as the Yunus Emre Institute 
and TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Diyanet 
(Religious Affairs), and several other means. Since the EU puts 
enlargement on hold, Turkey, Russia, and China have started to take 
advantages in the Balkan region. This situation once again underlines 
the competition of the two rivals, Russia and Turkey, over the Balkan 
region. Throughout history, Russians and Turks made considerable 
efforts to control the Balkans. Even though the region’s countries prefer 
to be a member of the EU and NATO, clearly, there is still a race between 
Russia and Turkey to influence the region countries’ governments and 
their citizens. The author argues that the internal problems of the EU 
and the complex political, ethnic, and religious issues of Western Balkan 
countries slow down the process of their EU membership. 
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Instead of indifference and traditionalism, Turkey has adopted a 
new and effective approach, the “multi-dimensional foreign policy”. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, the originator of this new foreign policy, put forward 
a new political vision which is regarded as a very appealing approach 
both inside and outside the country. This new policy discourse called 
“Zero Problems with Neighbours” (Sandıklı, 2015) emerged when the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2002. In this 
context, the discourse of “Zero Problems with Neighbours” is a slogan 
summarising Turkey’s expectations with regards to its relations with 
neighbouring countries; moreover, Turkey wants to eliminate all the 
problems from its relations with neighbours or at least minimise them 
as much as possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). After adopting its new 
policy/vision towards neighbours, the Turkish government signed a 
number of fruitful initiatives, such as resolving the Cyprus problem, 
ending hostility with Syria, and normalising relations with Armenia. 
However, after some years, Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problem” policy turned 
into zero neighbours. Briefly, Turkey’s relations with its neighbours 
always fluctuate and yet the issues remain unsolved. In addition, new 
problems have emerged in the region as a result of the Arab Spring. 
 
Turkey and the Middle East 
 
The Middle East has various geographic definitions; however, it is 
appropriate to identify the Middle East region in a narrow sense, a 
region between the Mediterranean Sea and Afghanistan, which 
includes the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt (Öztek, 2009). Due to the 
existing historical, cultural, and social proximity with people of the 
Middle East, both direct and indirect effects of developments in the 
Middle East is closely related to Turkey (Sander, 1998, pp. 26-52). A 
strong social and cultural tie with the Middle Eastern countries, which 
improved throughout history, allowed Turkey to enhance its relations 
with all the countries, without excluding any of them. In the region, 
Turkey claims to have mutual respect and respect for the principles of 
non-interference in neighbouring countries internal affairs. Turkey’s 
fundamental aim towards the region is to have bilateral and multilateral 
co-operation in order to boost relations, create a peaceful atmosphere, 
and contribute to the establishment of stability in the entire region.  
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There are many elements that are effective in Turkey’s Middle East 
policy (İnat, 2017). History, geography, foreign policy preferences of 
political elites as well as social factors and the geopolitical structure are 
the main factors that have an impact on Turkey’s regional policy. There 
is another component to add to the all these factors: the close relations 
between the West and Turkey (TASAM, 2011). This connection with the 
West has had both positive and negative effects for a long time on 
shaping their relations with the Middle East. However, this process has 
begun to reverse in the last two decades. Even though there have been 
several disputes and diplomatic tensions between Turkey and its allies, 
and the West, Turkey started to develop its own policies regarding the 
Middle East. 
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is widely accepted 
that Turkey largely distanced itself from the Middle East. Turkey’s 
different national identity and the emerging new political identity were 
the most important factors and reasons why Turkey distanced itself 
from the Middle East and the Arab world. Turkey gave priority to 
restructuring the internal structure of the country, and with the 
Ataturk’s leadership, a modern and secular nation-state was built. In 
this context, Turkey’s secularisation and Westernization process 
inevitably distanced Turkey from the Middle East. The new priority of 
Turkey’s foreign policy was to guarantee Turkey’s continuity. Thus, 
Turkey abdicated all claims in the Ottoman geographical sway or 
cultural heritage and has adopted the status quo approach to foreign 
policy. So, the definition of Turkey’s “national interest” remained 
limited to its own territory, and consequently Turkey stood idly by the 
Arabic world’s problems. In this period, the very first decade of the 
Republic, the most important element of Turkish foreign policy has 
been the activities to solve border problems (border determination and 
border security). The existence of the border issues with Middle Eastern 
neighbours has been an obstacle for Turkey to develop close relations 
with countries in the region. Another reason why Turkey remained 
unresponsive in the Middle East after World War I is that it took a long 
time for Middle Eastern nations to gain independence (Sinkaya, 2011). 
Therefore, Turkey was obliged to conduct its relations with the region 
via Western countries. However, it is not possible to say that Turkey has 
completely stopped relations with the Middle East. In this regard, close 
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relations were developed with Iran, the only independent Middle 
Eastern country during this period. After Iraq formed an independent 
state, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan signed the Saadabad Pact in 
1937 in order to secure the region.  
After World War II, both the international system and the 
geopolitical structure of the Middle East region were reshaped. In this 
period, the countries of the region have gained independence, but in a 
short span of time, the Cold War began to affect the region. The Soviet 
Union emerged as a power which threatened Turkey’s security; that is 
why Turkey entered into a political alliance with the West. Finally, 
Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and Turkey-West relations evolved into a 
military alliance. Thus, Turkey started to strengthen its alliance with the 
West in order to benefit from the power and opportunities; Turkey tried 
to align its interests to the West’s own security and regional interests. 
Turkey’s pro-Western policy in the region included developing good 
relations with Israel (Balcı, 2011, pp. 117-136). Turkey was the first 
country to recognise Israel in the region. This recognition has triggered 
opposition from Arab nationalists, who see it as a stab in the back of the 
Arab world. For this reason, the relationship with Israel and parallelly 
the western link adversely affected the course of relations with the 
Middle Eastern countries for a long time. During this period, i.e. 1950-
1960, due to rising Arab nationalism in the Arab world, the Ottoman 
heritage, and Turkey’s Western-oriented policies, Turkey was excluded 
from the Middle East. In the 1960s, Turkey’s foreign policy interests 
began to diverge from those of the West from time to time. In 
particular, its Western allies did not support Turkey’s arguments on the 
issue of Cyprus. Therefore, Turkey’s foreign policy entered a new 
period, diversifying its foreign policy relations with countries which it 
neglected before in order to find support and new partners. Thus, a 
multidimensional politics began to emphasize the development of 
relations with Third World and Arab states in Turkish foreign policy. The 
first reflection of Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy in the 
Middle East was seen in the Turkey-Israel relations, which negatively 
affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab Middle East. When a war 
broke out in 1967 between Israel and the Arabs, Turkey announced 
blocking its bases in the country to prevent the US from aiding Israel 
against the Arabs. After the 1973 Oil Crisis in the Middle Eastern 
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countries, Turkey came a little closer to the region. Despite striving for 
multidimensional foreign policy, in this period, the Western link 
maintained its central place in Turkish foreign policy. The centrality of 
the protection of Turkey’s foreign and security policy, alliance with the 
West, the continuing influence of nationalism in the Arab world limited 
the influence of Turkey’s Middle East “initiative” in the region.  
In the 1980s, two important developments occurred, and Turkey’s 
Middle East policy was affected by two different events. During this 
period, the fighting against separatist “PKK”, terrorism became one of 
the most important issues of Turkish politics. Additionally, the fact that 
Syria and Iraq aided the PKK in Turkey added a new problem to the 
relations with these countries alongside water sharing issues. On the 
other hand, Turkey’s new overseas economic expansion and export-
based economic growth strategy made it necessary for the country to 
establish good relations with countries in the region. In this period, Iraq 
and Iran became important trading partners of Turkey. In order to boost 
trade within the region and development of economic relations, Turkey, 
Iran, and Pakistan established the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO). However, Turkey could not achieve the expected results from 
actively supporting the Gulf War policy. The war and embargo entailed 
high costs for the Turkish economy, and new security issues also 
emerged. Turkey’s Middle East policy during the 1990s was shaped by 
security concerns due to terrorism, which threatened the territorial 
integrity of Turkey. Middle Eastern neighbours supported the PKK, and 
even the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was sheltered in Syria for many 
years; as a result, relations with Syria became rather tense. However, 
increasing diplomatic and political pressure by Turkey on Syria in 1998 
yielded favourable results, and Syria expelled Öcalan, the leader of the 
PKK terrorist organisation from its territory. Subsequently, when the 
Adana Memorandum of Understanding was signed in October 1998 
between Syria and Turkey, the relations with both Syria and the Middle 
East became cooperative, replacing the former security-oriented policy 
and the highly tense atmosphere.  
Still, the mandate of March 1 for military action led to mounting US 
political pressure, and Turkey started to improve its relations with Syria 
and Iran, which made the countries of the region adopt a more positive 
approach towards Turkey and change their perspectives. Then Turkey 
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was no longer seen as the West’s outpost in the region, and the Middle 
East countries were convinced that it followed an independent policy 
regarding the region, although it had a partnership with the US. The 
“revision” of Turkish foreign policy continued to gain momentum in the 
2000s, and with the new government, the Justice and Development 
Party/AKP, Turkish foreign diplomacy was based on a concrete vision. 
This vision sets out that due to Turkey’s historical, geopolitical, 
demographic, and economic state structure, the country should have a 
central role in the international system (Davutoğlu, 2008). Ensuring 
regional security and economic integration are the most important 
aspects of Turkish foreign policy and the new vision regarding the 
Middle East. The most important element of Turkey’s Middle East policy 
is to ensure peace and stability in the region. The second step of the 
Visionary Middle East policy is that the separate bilateral relations 
between countries in the region must be converted to multilateral 
cooperation agreements with Turkey. In addition to this, Turkish leaders 
believe that a political transformation is necessary for the Middle East 
as well. However, instead of imposing this change from the outside, 
they suggest that each country should take its own decisions based on 
its own internal dynamics.  
 
Turkey, Central Asia, and the Caucasus 
 
On March 16, 1921, Turkey signed the Friendship and Brotherhood 
Agreement with Soviet Russia. In fact, with this agreement, Turkey 
perceived Central Asia as an internal affair of the Soviet Union. For this 
reason, Turkey conducted its relations with the region through Moscow 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Turkey’s membership 
in NATO in 1952 increased tensions between the parties (Evedenci, 
2013). In 1985, with Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies, such as the glasnost 
and perestroika, the Soviet Union began to moderate future Soviet 
policies and Turkey started to establish limited relations with Central 
Asia.  
In 1991, the Soviet Union’s disintegration created a shock effect in 
the whole global community; however, the greatest impact was felt in 
Turkey. Turkey’s foreign policy did not have an answer to the question 
“what if the Soviet Union collapses?”. Therefore, Turkey was caught 
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totally unprepared for this situation. At the end of 1991, 15 new states 
emerged in the region, and Turkey pledged a promise of international 
support to these states and it was the first country to recognise them. 
After recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, especially with 
the Turkic Republics, grew rapidly. Based on religious, linguistic, and 
cultural ties with Turkey, five countries caught the attention of Turkey 
more than others; these are Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan (Evedenci, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 1. The Turkic Republics. Source: The Interpreter, “Turkey - 
Turkic Republics and Groups” 
 
In the next period, Turkey tried to gain political influence in the 
region and be a role model, particularly for the Turkic Republics. But 
soon it was noticed that Turkey, without taking into consideration 
Russian influence in the region, could not develop any cooperation with 
Central Asian countries (Denizhan, 2010, p. 18). Due to the economic 
and military dependence on the Soviet Union, Russia was able to 
maintain its position as the most important actor in the region. In the 
process of gaining their independence, Turkey was not able to better 
analyse the developments in these countries. First of all, the formation 
of Russian minorities in every country in the region, constituting 41% of 
Kazakhstan’s population, for example, led to a tendency to harmonise 
the foreign policy to be followed by the regional countries with Russian 
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foreign policy (Denizhan, 2010, p. 20). Also, the new republics realised 
that Turkey had limited economic resources and they soon understood 
that Turkey could not be a model to them, either economically, or 
politically and cannot guarantee the promises given in the process of 
development of bilateral relations. Gaining political influence over 
Turkey’s Caucasus-Central Asia plan failed so Turkey changed its policy 
regarding the region and presented itself as a soft power based on 
giving priority to economic cooperation. Behind this necessity, there 
was a need for essential cheap energy, particularly oil and gas, for the 
economic development model to increase Turkey’s exports.  
With the AKP, i. e. Justice and Development Party government, 
Turkey intensified its relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia again. 
Since 1995, the US has supported the transportation of oil and natural 
gas through Turkey to international markets and this is consistent with 
the interests of Turkey. Moreover, as a member of NATO, Turkey 
supported the USA’s argument regarding Akbazhya and South Ossetia 
and Turkey did not recognise them as independent countries.  
 




The South Asian region, in the centre of the world’s focus and with 
its surface area, cultural accumulation, economic potential, human 
resources that make up about four-quarters of the world’s population, 
and with the importance of the evolution of the international system 
together, is unique and gaining importance in the global strategic 
equation. The region is becoming one of the geostrategic and geo-
economic centres of the world. The dynamic developments in South 
Asian countries and the position between global centres play a critical 
role for the future of the world (Tüyzüsoğlu, 2012). Turkey has always 
had strong historical and cultural relations with South Asian countries.  
India gained its independence on August 15, 1947, and Turkey 
immediately recognised India and established diplomatic relations. Due 
to certain historical and religious-cultural reasons, which should not be 
ignored, the trend of relations between India and Turkey has been 
stagnant. However, Turkey’s support in the issue of the separation of 
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Pakistan and Kashmir had a negative effect on the relation between 
Turkey and India. However, it can be seen that relations between India 
and Turkey and the intensification of linkages between the parties 
gained momentum towards the end of the 20th century and the very 
first years of 21st century. Pakistan was founded as an independent 
state on August 14, 1947, and it was formed on the basis of close 
friendship and brotherhood with Turkey. Many agreements have been 
signed between the two countries, both at military and economic levels. 
Both countries are members of the D-8 (Developing Eight), a common 
market association, and Turkey also continuously supports Pakistan in 
international issues. Turkish foreign policy regarding South Asia is very 
optimistic and Turkey is eager to act as a mediator and solve the issue 
of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.  
Asia has always maintained its importance in Turkish foreign policy, 
but their distance and the internal problems of Turkey and the issues in 
its neighbouring states made it impossible to pursue an active policy in 
South Asia in the favour of Turkey. In particular, it can be established 
that four years had no momentum and were lost in Turkish foreign 
policy between 1998 and 2002, but there are exceptions. However, 
Davutoğlu, the main character of the AK Party government’s foreign 
policy, clearly expressed the importance of Asia to Turkey in his 
strategic depth book, which was published in 2001. Accordingly, 
Davutoğlu defines Asia as a geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural 
basin and Turkey is seeking to enter the basin in these three axes 
because the new emerging centres of power are located in its passage 
and intersection. The AK Party, taking into account these features, 
redefined Turkey’s Asian policies based on the continent. In this sense, 
Turkey applied to sign the ASEAN friendship and cooperation 
agreement in 2008, in order to specify foreign policy strategic priorities 
in Asia and its interests on continental scale. According to it, following 
the economic interests based primarily on Asia policy, aimed to improve 
the trade relations between Turkey and countries in the region. Turkey 





In recent years, the People's Republic of China, which has become 
the second largest economy in the world, is increasingly concentrating 
on high-tech and value-added production areas. As an emerging 
economy, Turkey is seeking to boost diplomatic and economic relations 
with China. What makes the last decade of the new Chinese global role 
interesting from Turkey’s perspective is that Turkey aims to benefit 
greatly from the recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was 
unveiled by Xi Jinping in late 2013. The initiative should be considered 
as a tool for both parties to seize the opportunity of enhancing relations. 
However, the BRI is not the only way that Turkey and China can 
cooperate or trade with each other and it does not mean that two 
countries did not have any ties before the announcement of the BRI. 
Turkey is seen as a hub of geopolitics where Turkish geopolitics can 
be classified as peripheral/semi-peripheral. Therefore, Turkey appears 
to hold a pivotal position in the context of China’s BRI project and is 
situated along China’s route of access to European markets. One of the 
Turkish’ government’s targets is to become a hub in the global supply 
chains that connect the Chinese and European markets with each other. 
(Turkey as a crossroad country, between Asia and Europe, aims to 
become the hub, link China and Europe, where China can deliver its 
goods to Europe. And this beneficial both for Turkey and China). 
 
Turkish Foreign Policy Intentions 
 
After the 2002 elections, Turkey’s foreign policy was undergoing 
major changes and increased dynamism (Türkmen, 2012). Both Turkey’s 
sense of unity and solidarity and its soft power abroad grew rapidly 
(Tüysüzoğlu, 2012). Turkey as a regional power in the global system is 
changing day by day and is increasing its economic and political weight 
to diversify its foreign policy. Turkey is seeking new countries to 
cooperate in political and economic fields in regions outside of Europe 
and North America.  
One of the issues discussed and elaborated on in this paper is that 
Turkish foreign policy has been changing its character in the recent 
period. Turkey, due to the Cold War ideological presuppositions and 
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systemic-oriented nature and safety, had to pursue a one-dimensional 
foreign policy paradigm for many years. And as an inherent 
consequence, it has been isolated geographically, adapting a new 
dynamic foreign policy, which is not welcomed by the international 
system. However, the most important point that the Turkish 
intelligentsia, the public, and international world should understand is 
that the Cold War is over, and the globalising world brings with it 
different values and policies. This is called the multipolar world. From 
that aspect, the new Turkish policy aims to use its soft power in its 
region and utilize the Ottoman heritage in neighbouring regions, such 
as the Balkans and the Caucasus (Aras, 2011, p. 26). In order to maintain 
a multidimensional foreign policy, Turkey should be an effective actor 
in the priority neighbourhoods, and it has been making efforts towards 
this goal for more than a decade now (Tüysüzoğlu, 2012).  
Severely affected by the global and regional developments, Turkey 
has launched a comprehensive program of change and transformation 
of foreign policy to guard national security and economic development 
and to stabilise domestic politics (Keyman, 2010). Turkey is trying to 
pursue a foreign policy decided in Ankara, without harming relations 
with the West; it is approaching the East, preferring a multifaceted and 
balanced foreign policy tendency as a Muslim state, without leaving its 
Western identity and values. Turkey displays both realistic and moral 
elements in its political discourse in order to ensure the national 
interests, namely that Turkey’s arguments in the international system 
should be carry more weight and that the system should be more 
collaborative. In the new era of foreign policy pursued by Turkey, it is 
possible to explain its new policies through a few basic principles. First, 
fighting against terrorism, which is a threat to Turkey’s national 
security, has a top priority based on adopting a realist foreign policy 
(SETA, 2012). Second, Turkey gives priority to economic development 
and growth, which directly contributes to the promotion of an effective 
foreign policy and resistance to threats against the country. Thirdly, it 
promotes humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian aid and adopts a 
value and morals-based foreign policy (Ataman, 2017). Finally, due to 
the rise of extreme nationalism and racism in Western and Central 
Europe, Turkey may redefine its traditional Western relations. Rising 
xenophobia towards foreigners and European hostility towards the 
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Islam and Erdogan have undermined the traditional alliance between 
the West and Turkey. As a result of this political marginalisation from 
Western countries and the problems over the last few years arising from 
the economic crisis, which the European Union Member States are 
facing, Turkey’s full EU membership is in the middle of the target. 
Therefore, it is inevitable for Turkey to develop alternative relations. 
(From Turkey's point of you, the internal problems of EU, mostly 
economic, and Turkey’s membership to the club are not related to each 
other but it is clear that EU won't accept Turkey as a member and that's 
why it is inevitable for Turkey to have partners as much as she can) As a 
result, Turkey’s perspective  in this regard is not to be ignored by 
Western European powers. 
Turkey is the only country, which is a member of the Council of 
Europe, NATO, the OECD, the G-20, and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference at the same time (Kısacık, 2010). Turkey, with its strength 
and soft power in neighbouring regions, economic growth, commitment 
to the fight against terrorism, maintaining energy security both for itself 
and Europe, and stopping immigration flows to Europe, is set to become 
an unchangeable partner for Europe (Küçükkeleş, 2012). The point here 
is that Turkey’s interests are also the interests of European states. Now, 
Europe’s security depends on Turkey’s security as a result of being 
neighbours. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria and the immigration 
problem once again showed how close Europe is to conflict zones. 
Through Turkey’s influence in its own region and also in the Balkans, 
North Africa, and South Asia and etc., it expects to establish close 
diplomatic, economic, military, and political ties. In this regard, Turkey’s 
expectation is to reduce tensions with European partners and achieve 
more reconciliation and cooperation. However, European countries’ 
recent actions, especially, the fact that they tried to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Turkey, and in particular, the efforts to be part of 
Turkey’s election campaigns, clearly indicate that European states’ 
elites and political leaders could not understand the importance of 
Turkey. Despite all these, the Readmission and migration agreement 
between Turkey and the EU, the already existing economic relations 
with several Western countries, the customs union with the European 





The Republic of Turkey has a geographical location in the world 
with unique features. Modern Turkey forms a land bridge that connects 
Asia to Southeastern Europe. During the Cold War, due to the its 
geographical position, in close proximity to the Soviet Union, Turkey 
was a strong ally of NATO. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, some assumed that Turkey’s role in the region 
waned. In contrast, Turkey is a crossroad where energy-rich eastern 
neighbours transfer raw-material through Turkey to large European 
energy markets. However, challenges are remaining. After the bipolar 
world system collapsed, Turkey’s foreign policy, which was stuck 
between a great power competition changed, in particular, the 2002 
elections brought a new perspective in terms of foreign policy in Turkey. 
The “Zero Problems with Neighbours” policy was effective for a while, 
and yet a short time later, due to the Arab Spring, Turkey found itself in 
such a condition that made Turkey intervene in conflicts in the Middle 
East, particularly the Syrian civil war for security reasons. We must 
mention that Turkey, throughout history, has always had problems with 
its neighbouring countries. However, a strong Turkey, especially in 
economic and military terms, can solve problems with its neighbours 
with a new vision of foreign policy. Ibn Khaldun once said that 
“Geography is destiny” and Turkey’s destiny is to overcome the 
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Romania: A Pragmatic Buffer State Between East and 
West 
Zoltán Megyesi & Éva Beáta Corey  
 
Romania is a relatively young country, and it has a unique cultural 
tradition with a mixture of many European cultural elements. In terms 
of language, Romanians lean towards Mediterranean countries (their 
language descends from a Vulgar Latin dialect), and in terms of religion, 
they lean towards the “Orthodox commonwealth” (a legacy of the 
Byzantine Empire and Slavic neighbours). Moreover, Romanian history 
is essentially a history of three separate lands, which were, at various 
points in time, under the control of other states (Pavlenko et al., 2014). 
The modern Romanian state is classified as a medium-sized and 
moderately populous country in Europe but in the context of “In-
between Europe”3 , it is a vast country, second only to Poland and 
Ukraine. Its area covers 238 397 km², but its population has fallen below 
20 million people according to recent years’ statistics. The country is 
covered by 28% mountainous area, 42% hills and plateaus, and 30% 
plains, while the three most characteristic natural geographical units 
are the Carpathians, the Danube, and the Black Sea. The Carpathians 
are a highly fragmented mountain range with relatively low altitude and 
a host of valleys and intra-mountainous depressions. However, the 
mountain range is not densely populated and has a lower urbanisation 
rate and unfavourable agricultural conditions. The Romanian literature 
refers to it as “a place of origin”, where the first Romanian state 
formation emerged (Săgeată, 2015). So, in this content, the Carpathians 
occupy a central place not only in geographical terms, but they 
represent a symbolic idea as well: the cradle of the Romanian nation 
and identity. Moreover, in the Romanian geopolitical and geographical 
mindset, the Carpathian Mountains are not an obstacle but a uniting 
feature. The Danube is Europe’s second largest river (2842 km); the 
river that is connecting countries, nations, languages, religions, and 
cultures from Germany to Moldova. In the case of Romania, the Danube 
                                               
3 The phrase refers to the group of countries situated from the Baltic Sea to the 
Mediterranean Sea. First used to refer to the buffer zone between Germany 
and Soviet Union between the two World Wars. 
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represents a connection with Europe, linking the port of Constanţa 
(Black Sea) to the port of Rotterdam (the North Sea) through the 
Danube-Main-Rhine and Danube-Black Sea canals, on the one hand, 
and creates a strict borderline separating the Balkans from the rest of 
greater Europe, on the other hand. For Romania, the Black Sea is the 
main gateway to the world’s waterways, providing the country with 
flexibility in trade. However, it is a critical strategic point not only for 
Romania but for the global power balance as well.  
The three historical regions of Romania are linked to three different 
areas of Europe: Wallachia to the Balkans, Moldavia to Eastern Europe, 
and Transylvania to Central Europe. This situation has created a 
constant “pull force” to three different directions, which are still 
present to this day (Csüllög – Gulyás, 2012). Because of this, the 
country’s macro-regional classification is not easy to define, although 
Romanian authors define Romania as a Central European country 
(Săgeată, 2015). This axiomatic location influences the geopolitical 
characteristics and position of Romania: The country is located at a 
European crossroad and lies at the confluence of different regions and 
areas of great powers. 
 
The Birth of Modern Romania and the Great Powers 
 
The 19th-century classical geopolitical trend introduced the so-
called buffer sate concept for those countries which are at the forefront 
of the interest of several major powers (Bernek, 2015). Romania is an 
excellent example of this concept. Its territory has long been the buffer 
zone of the neighbouring great powers. In antiquity, it was a border 
region of the Roman and Eastern Roman Empire, in the Middle Ages a 
contiguous region between Byzantium, the Kingdom of Hungary, the 
nomadic Turkish and Mongol, and Russian territories. During the 15–
19th century, these lands became a frontier area under the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Empire. This dependency lasted for decades, and the 
country became a buffer state on the borders of the Habsburg, 
Ottoman, and Russian empires. Thus, – not surprisingly – the existence 
of historical Romanian principalities was dependent on great powers. 
The pragmatic foreign policy of the principalities, and then of the 
modern Romanian state – although  heavily dependent in many ways – 
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was able to make good use of the declining powers of the empires or 
their conflicts with each other; in particular, it was able to influence the 
significant power decisions of the late 19th and 20th centuries (Csüllög – 
Gulyás, 2012). 
In 1859, the two historical Romanian principalities were united. 
Three years later, the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
took the name of Romania. In 1878, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1877-1878, sanctified by the decision of the Berlin Congress, the 
state, complemented by North Dobruja, gained independence after 
centuries of Turkish dependence. Great power’s geopolitical 
considerations have played a significant role in achieving independence: 
Romania became the buffer zone between the “sick man of Europe”, i. 
e. the weakening Ottoman Empire and Russian expansionist efforts 
focused on acquiring the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles) and gaining more influence on the Balkan Peninsula. 
Due to the geographical location of the emerging Kingdom of Romania, 
embedded between three great powers: Austria-Hungary, the Russian 
Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, the state found itself in a complicated 
geopolitical situation. Although Austria-Hungary and the Russian 
Empire were potential enemies of the Romanian irredentist movement, 
the leaders of the Romanian Kingdom decided to take an Austrian 
orientation. Behind this decision, there was a need for the support of 
the Dual Monarchy against Russian threat (Gulyás – Csüllög, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the Romanian irredentist movement 
was to unite all the Romanian people in one single state. Alexandru 
Papiu Ilarian4 elaborated this geopolitical concept and concretised the 
territories of Greater Romania: Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, 
Bukovina, Transylvania, Banat, Bihar, Maramureş, and Dobruja, while 
later Romanian geographers also defined the new county’s natural 
boundaries from the Tisza river to the Dniester and the Black Sea 
(Gulyás – Csüllög, 2016). 
World War I brought about the fulfilment of Romanian ambitions. 
Romania was officially an ally of Austria-Hungary from the outset, and 
Charles I, the first king of Romania, also promoted entering the war on 
                                               
4 A Transylvanian Romanian revolutionary, lawyer and historian (27 September 
1827 – 23 October 1877) 
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the side of the Central Powers. However, after the country remained 
neutral until 1916, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente. 
Although it suffered a military defeat, it still ended the war on the 
winning side. The Peace Treaties of Paris awarded Transylvania, 
Southern Maramures, Eastern Banat, a part of Eastern Hungary and 
Bukovina to Romania. Bessarabia was also, by chance, gained from the 
former ally of Romania, i. e. Russia, as the victorious powers readily 
acknowledged the territorial occupation of the Romanians due to the 
hostile Bolshevik takeover of Russia. With all these new territories, the 
country’s area and population doubled. 
With the peace treaties of WWI, the reorganisation of Central and 
Eastern Europe took place in the spirit of the French geopolitical 
concept of cordon sanitaire. It created a string of “nation-states” in the 
place of the former empires, and these new nation states were 
intended to curb and prevent German and Russian (Bolshevik) 
expansion. Francophile Romania was a valuable player among these 
nation-states. However, the concept failed; hence, often rivalling small 
states first became a part of the sphere of interest of Nazi Germany and, 
after World War II, that of the Soviet Union. (During World War II, 
Romania committed itself finally to the Axis powers, and in addition to 
its large number of auxiliary troops, the Ploiești oil fields played a vital 
strategic and economic role in the implementation of German military 
goals.) As a defeated state after World War II, Romania had to disclaim 
Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the Soviet Union and South Dobruja 
to Bulgaria, but Northern Transylvania (regained by Hungary in 1940) 
was returned following a decision based on the interests of Soviet 
foreign policy. With these, the border of present Romania was formed, 
and the country successfully kept the ring of the strategic importance 




Figure 1. Territorial changes of Romania between 1859 and 1945. 
Source: Elemér Illyés (1982). National Minorities in Romania 
 
During the Cold War, the country belonged to the Soviet sphere of 
interest and was a member of the Warsaw Pact, but was relatively 
loosely tied to the Soviet Union and, with its often-stand-alone foreign 
policy within the socialist bloc, gained particular popularity among and 
good relations with Western countries. Romania did not participate in 
the military invasion of Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring in 1968; 
Richard Nixon, President of the United States, visited Romania in 1969; 
Romania participated in the Los Angeles Olympics (1984), boycotted by 
the rest of the socialist bloc. Also, it was the only country in Eastern 
Europe that, by introducing strict austerity programs, repaid all its 
external debt by 1988 (at the cost of the living standards and citizens’ 
well-being). As a result, the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu was 
one of the few politicians in the socialist bloc who were classified as 
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“good communists” in the West. However, as Western criticism of 
Romania’s human rights record was mounting in the 1980s, Romania 
became more and more isolated on the international stage (Micu, 
2010). 
 
Romania’s Steadfast Movement Towards the West 
 
The changes after 1989 forced Romania to determine its place in 
the new Europe. One of the ideas was to regain Bessarabia/Moldova 
and by this action the country would be able to restore stability, ensure 
its development and gain secondary power status. After Moldova 
declared its independence in 1991, the Romanian and Moldovan 
governments sought to unite the two countries for some time, but 
Russian and Ukrainian minorities in Transnistria strongly opposed the 
expansion of the influence of Bucharest. Also, Russia formulated strong 
opposition to the accession of Moldova to Romania. In such 
circumstances, the possibility of reunification lost its attractiveness to 
both sides, Romanians and Moldavians alike for a short period (Varga, 
2009). 
Afterwards, Romania, in order to avoid international isolation, 
started to demonstrate an apparent political openness towards 
Western integration. The country participated in several initiatives and 
regional projects in the Balkans and the Black Sea region (e.g. CEFTA, 
BSEC) and also took individual initiatives in the political and diplomatic 
spheres to achieve EU and NATO membership. However, the road 
leading to it proved to be one full of difficulties: The positive image of 
the Revolution quickly faded into a negative one in the West, the image 
of a poor country full of internal issues. Reform processes were 
progressing slowly, corruption and organised crime dramatically 
increased, and images of ethnic and social violence (such as the inter-
ethnic clash in Târgu Mureș5 or the so-called “Mineriads”6) severely 
                                               
5 Also called Black March, referring to a violent incident between the Romanian 
and Hungarian ethnic groups in Transylvania. In March 1990, brief but violent 
clashes occurred between the two ethnic groups in Târgu Mureș. The clashes 
left 5 people dead and 300 injured. 
6 The mineriads were a series of violent demonstrations by Jiu Valley miners in 
Bucharest during the 1990s. The movements were started for political and later 
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damaged the image of the country (Lakatos, 2015). Among other things, 
these factors prevented Romania from joining NATO at the same time 
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. Moreover, apart 
from internal political considerations, NATO did not want to increase 
the concern of the Russian Federation by pushing its borders to the East 
so quickly (Kozma, 2018). 
Romania’s situation changed drastically after September 11, 2001. 
The new conditions favoured the geopolitical situation of the country, 
in which Romania became an important ally for the USA in Europe. 
Romania shared certain security elements with the US security policy, 
especially those that coincided with its ideas concerning the Black Sea 
region and the countries belonging to the former Soviet sphere of 
interest. The country’s NATO accession in 2004, in addition to the 
country’s achievements so far, can be primarily attributed to the new 
geopolitical needs and considerations of the US after September 11, 
2001: that is, Romania’s proximity to the front and its willingness to 
support the US by all means (Varga, 2009). 
This unconditional Romanian support towards US policy created 
severe doubt for the European Union: European leaders believed that 
Romania had gone too far in seeking America’s friendship, and once it 
became a member of the Union, it would act as a representative of 
American interests. In other words, Romania’s EU accession, 
complementing the strict Atlanticist policies of the Polish and British 
governments, threatened the progress and goals of European 
integration. Although many other Central European countries followed 
this strict Atlanticist policy, Poland and Romania are two major ones, 
having more weight within the EU. The accession of Romania in 2007 
can be partly seen as the EU’s fears that further delay in the integration 
of the country will render Romania’s American orientation irreversible, 
which may weaken the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy (Varga, 2009). 
Finally, the country’s accession to NATO (2004) and then the EU 
(2007) was the result of the political efforts made by the Romanians to 
“return to Europe” and the importance of Romania’s strategic position. 
In particular, the efforts of the EU and NATO are important to “get their 
                                               
economic reasons. According to official data, the six mineriads had a total of 9 
dead and approx. 1250 wounded, while 605 persons were arrested. 
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feet” into the Black Sea region, from where they can monitor and limit 
Russia’s “traditional” sphere of influence and be part of the region’s 
energy programs (Varga, 2009). 
 
The Highly Valuable Strategic Location of Romania 
 
Romania’s role in regional security and its strategic geographical 
position has been appreciated over the past decades in terms of 
ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The country, situated in the 
direct neighbourhood of the Balkan Peninsula and the Post-Soviet 
region, with an exit to the Black Sea, provides a route for the Caucasian 
countries, Central Asia, and the Middle East. These regions are subject 
to almost constant conflicts. The Yugoslav Wars (1991–1995) was the 
worst armed conflict on the continent since World War II, followed by 
the break-up of Kosovo by Serbia (1999), which is still a potential source 
of conflict. The Republic of Moldova is in a frozen conflict due to the 
break-up of Transnistrian territories (1992), not to mention the recent 
events in Ukraine. The Caucasus is also a hot spot with a lot of frozen 
conflicts 7  with fragile peace: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and separatism in North Caucasus. From the 2000s onwards, 
the turbulent Middle Eastern events have made Romania more 
important for neighbouring western states. 
Besides, Eastern Europe has become a conflict zone between NATO 
and the Russian Federation in recent years. Such tension, which had not 
been experienced since the Cold War, re-emerged between Russia and 
the United States following the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. 
From the point of view of Russia, some parts of Eastern Europe and the 
Black Sea region belong to its sphere of interest. Although the Black Sea 
(as an inland sea) is far from the world’s oceans, its regional significance 
                                               
7 The term “frozen conflict” is used to describe conditions on territories where 
active armed conflict may have ended, but no peace treaty or political 
resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides. 
In the separatist territories that have become frozen conflict zones, internal 
sovereignty is often achieved in the breakaway territory at the expense of 




is still high. It is a sensitive region that could be the scene of a geographic 
outbreak from Moscow and for the maritime world power (formerly for 
the British, today for the Americans), it means the possibility of 
encirclement and isolation (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Political and power situation in the Black Sea region.  
Source: Toucas (2017). Russia’s Design in The Black Sea: Extending the 
Buffer Zone 
 
The two most influential powers of the Black Sea region are 
considered to be Russia and Turkey, but the region is not indifferent to 
the United States, either. However, since the US cannot be present with 
a permanent force according to the Montreal Convention (1936), the 
role of its local allies is significant. The importance of Turkey among the 
NATO member states of the region has been evident since the Cold War, 
but the unstable Turkish domestic political situation, the tensions and 
disputes with the Western countries (including the US), and improving 
Turkish–Russian relations of recent years has given Romania an 
increasing role. Moreover, from a US perspective the geopolitical 
importance of Romania, together with Poland, is the fundamental pillar 
of the defence zone against a possible Russian expansion, stretching 
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from the Baltics through the Visegrad countries to the Adriatic and the 
Balkans (Hegedűs, 2016).  
This role of Romania from a US perspective is growing in 
importance, and it seems not to be a short-term obsession. Besides the 
involvement in the Middle East and interfering with direct Russian 
expansion and threat, the US has economic reasons for such activity, 
too. Both the United States (in terms of geopolitical security) and the 
European Union (mainly for economic reasons) have tried to encourage 
the supply diversification of European countries to reduce dependence 
on Russian gas (Papatulica, 2015). The process once called the “Great 
Game” is now being reloaded again, with the only difference that 
instead of two actors – which were the British Empire and Tsarist Russia 
in the old days –, much more players are involved nowadays. Russia has 
a geopolitical advantage, but the US, the EU, China, and even some 
Central Asian powers – such as Iran or Turkey – want their shares from 
Central Asia and the Caucasus region’s “wealth”, and this race has high 
stakes (Lakatos, 2015). In order to be a proficient competitor, the West 
needs its own regional outposts, and Romania can play a crucial role in 
obtaining them. Due to its geographical position in the neighbourhood 
of vast proven reserves of natural gas and crude oil, Romania has a triple 
geostrategic and geo-economic dimension (Fig. 3): as a direct source of 
energy (with the newly discovered significant natural gas field in the 
continental shelf of the Black Sea), a major transport corridor for 
Eurasian energy resources to EU consumers, and a significant factor of 
energy security for the EU (Papatulica, 2015).  
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Figure 3. Caspian oil and gas transport to Western Europe.  
Source: Săgeată (2015). Romania. A Geopolitical Outline 
 
As a result of the highly appreciated strategic location and close 
cooperation with the United States, Romania has been upgrading some 
military bases in recent years. According to this military aspiration, 
there renovations have been taking place at the Constanta Air Base, 
where the US is deploying military equipment in Romania. NATO’s 
Missile Defence Complex in Deveşelu is also a remarkable investment. 
By 2020, several military equipment will have been replaced or 
purchased. Among other things, the Romanian Air Force and Navy are 
being modernised, and Patriot Air Defence Missiles are being purchased 
to increase operational capabilities. Romania is the first European state, 
which acquires HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) and 
GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) systems from the 
United States. The increasing American military presence and 
technology in the country has a positive impact on the regional role of 
Romania (Kozma, 2018). 
The two traditional major powers in the region – Turkey and Russia 
– naturally oppose this special friendship with the US. Turkey resents 
the growing importance of Romania because it is weakening the 
essential role of Turkey in NATO. Russia has also been critical of 
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Romania’s strong American commitment because Romania is operating 
as an American “fortification” in a region that has been traditionally 
inaccessible to the United States. Russia is concerned not only over the 
possible intrusion from the US, but the appearance and strengthening 
of energy transport projects. In 2017, Vladimir Putin condemned 
Romania as a growing threat, but there is a concern on both sides. 
Romania is also troubled by the Russian troops stationed in Transnistria, 
which is de jure part of the Republic of Moldova. The confrontations in 
the Eastern region of Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea represent 
another threat to Romania. These issues have significantly reduced the 
physical distance between Russia and Romania: mainly through the 
appearance of the Russian’s warships at the port of Sevastopol and the 
missile systems deployed in the Crimea (Kozma, 2018). 
In recent years, a third great power has appeared on the horizon of 
Romania’s external relations. Romanian – Chinese relations were 
intense during the two countries’ communist periods due to the fact 
that both kept a certain distance from the Soviet Union. After the 
collapse of the socialist bloc, the relationship remained unchanged but 
shifting, but from the mid-2000s, under the chairmanship of Traian 
Băsescu, it turned to very modest (Popescu – Brînză, 2018). Presently, 
however, they have become more active through the “16+1” 
relationship. The 16+1 format is a mechanism of dialogue and 
cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. It is meant to improve trade and investments, develop 
infrastructure and the energy sector, and strengthen people-to-people 
relations. The 16+1 forum takes place every year in one of the CEE 
countries or China. The forum took place for the first time in 2012 in 
Poland; after that Romania hosted the summit in 2013, a moment that 
became a landmark for its bilateral relations with China. During the 
summit, Romania signed with China more than ten memorandums of 
understanding, which proposed projects valued at 8.5 billion euros and 
focus on strategic energy investments such as the Tarnița-Lăpuștești 
Hydropower Plant, the Rovinari Thermal Power, or the Cernavodă 
Nuclear Plant. However, more than six years after the summit, some of 
them are still under negotiation due to the internal political instability 
of Romania and the changes of governments. For China, which has a 
stable and long-lasting government, the Romanian political fluctuations 
81 
contributed to somewhat stagnant bilateral relations. While problems 
and delays have plagued all these projects, Romanian politicians and 
officials remain interested in attracting Chinese investments (Popescu – 
Brînză, 2018). In May 2019, Romania finally signed a preliminary 
agreement on the expansion of the Cernavodă nuclear power plant by 
the China Nuclear Power Corporation (Nuclear Engineering 
International, 2019).  
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also creates new opportunities for 
the Romania-China relationship. Romania’s interest in getting involved 
in the BRI is present, and there is a legal framework for it in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2015. Although 
Romania, considering itself one of the first European countries that 
signed such an agreement with China, has not attracted any investment 
or project as part of the BRI so far. Although many projects listed above 
are labelled as BRI investments, in fact, these had been proposed before 
the initiative was launched (Popescu – Brînză, 2018). The unstable 
Romanian government might be the reason why the development of 
closer cooperation and relations under the BRI have not progressed in 
recent years. 
Besides the direct relations with great powers, Romania is 
strengthening its relationships with other European countries by 
participating in regional cooperation and forums. The most recent and 
the most interesting is the Three Seas Initiative. This forum has twelve 
member states along a north-south axis from the Baltic Sea to 
the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. The members met for their first 
summit in 2016 in Dubrovnik, where they announced the framework of 
this collaboration: the main goal of the initiative is to create a “north-
south” energy and infrastructure corridor in the region. The Trump 
administration has been vocal in its support for the Three Seas Initiative 
as an opportunity to lessen the region’s dependence on Russian energy 
imports, and openly expressing criticism against the EU and western 
European leaders. The EU formulated some scepticism as the heavy 
political support from the US could be used to undermine the EU’s 
authority or standing in the region (Atlantic Council, 2019). 
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Challenges for the Future 
 
The most critical elements of Romania’s foreign policy program are 
security and stability. In the National Defence Strategy of Romania 
(2015-2019) and the Military Strategy of Romania (2016), the country 
appears as an active participant in conflict prevention and containment. 
Romania would like to maintain regional cooperation within the South 
(Balkans) and Eastern countries (Republic of Moldova, Ukraine) and 
supports Western integration. Although, in recent decades, the 
development of Romania’s external relations and its role in regional and 
world politics can be considered positive, there are unresolved 
objectives and problems in the country. According to the National 
Security Strategy of Romania and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, there are three crucial areas for the eastern vector of Romanian 
foreign policy: the Black Sea region, the Western Balkans, and the 
Republic of Moldova. The most important argument for this security 
policy is the geographical position of the country, and thus its essential 
role in NATO (Tóth, 2009). 
Over the last decade, Romania’s aspiration of (re-)unification with 
Moldova has been more and more open; the “Union discourse” has 
become widespread and almost universal on the agenda of the 
Romanian political elite. 8  Today, Moldova has become one of the 
frontrunners in the geopolitical struggle of Eastern Europe: Western-
oriented and pro-Russian political groups have been adding to the 
tensions in the region. In the past decade, Russia’s foreign policy has 
aimed to support a federal independent Moldovan system that includes 
Transnistria. In this context, the Romanian and Romanian-friendly 
Moldavian parties are concerned over a federal Moldova that would 
have more influence from Moscow. Romania supports Moldova’s Euro-
Atlantic integration to achieve its unionist goals, even if it further 
undermines Romanian-Russian relations and risks increasing the 
number of Russian troops in Transnistria (Barabás, 2015).  
                                               
8 For example, Traian Băsescu and Victor Ponta have been arguing for the 
union, and there are some emerging organisations such as Action 2012 or 
Union friends (Prietenii Unirii). 
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The Black Sea is an area of geostrategic and geopolitical 
importance. From a US point of view, Romania’s enhanced military 
presence in the Black Sea assists the containment of Russia and 
represents a backup of the ever-unstable alliance with Turkey. For that 
reason, Romania necessitates regional stability and close Euro-Atlantic 
cooperation, also calls for a democratic and prosperous agreement on 
the broader area of the Black Sea. However, on the Black Sea, Romania 
must also reckon with Turkey. As a result of the recent turn towards 
cooperation in Russian–Turkish relations, Turkey can return to its earlier 
vision of the Black Sea as a Russian–Turkish condominium (Hegedűs, 
2016). The Western Balkans also plays a critical geopolitical role. 
Romania, as a NATO and European Union member state, supports these 
countries joining NATO and the EU and encourages stability. Romania 
has especially good relations with Serbia: nowadays, Romania belongs 
to one of the few NATO and EU member countries which do not 
recognise Kosovo’s independence (because of its own Hungarian 
minorities who aspire for autonomy) and stand out for Serbia’s 
territorial integrity (Micu, 2010).  
However, Romania’s relationship with its other neighbours is not 
quite harmonious. There is a significant concern over the Romanian 
minority situation in Ukraine, and Romania is involved in disputes over 
the maritime borders as well as the affiliation of the Danube Delta and 
the Snake Island (Pavlenko et al., 2014). With its southern neighbour, 
Bulgaria, the relationship cannot be considered hostile, nor 
cooperative. Bulgarian foreign policy follows a quite different political 
perspective than Romania. When Romania’s accession to the EU at the 
same time as Bulgaria seemed impracticable, Bulgaria requested 
separate handling of the accession intention from Brussels (Micu, 
2010). A few years ago, the Russian–Turkish conflict opened up a chance 
to improve the NATO’s maritime positions in the Black Sea, and even 
Turkey supported the Romanian initiative to create a joint NATO naval 
force in the Black Sea; however, Bulgaria firmly rejected any anti-
Russian organisation, and with this, Romania resigned from the 
initiative. Regarding Hungary, the affairs of the 1.2 million Hungarian 
minority people in Transylvania sometimes cause significant friction 
between the two EU and NATO member states. The permanent issues 
of Szekler autonomy, Hungarian secondary and tertiary education, 
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incidents of using Hungarian and Szekler flags (The Economist, 2019) 
have led to a severe interstate dispute. 
In addition to foreign policy and geopolitical challenges, Romania 
must also consider its severe domestic problems. Although 
macroeconomic indicators show significant improvement and 
economic growth in the last few years,9 the domestic conditions of the 
country are not considered to be positive. Based on recent events, 
Romanian domestic politics is characterised by instability and significant 
differences of interest (5 Prime Ministers in 5 years), aggravated by 
corruption. Society is experiencing crisis phenomena; the standard of 
living is still far below the EU average.10 In addition to the generally 
unfavourable demographic situation, the population has dropped 
dramatically since, after the accession to the European Union, masses 
migrated temporarily or permanently to Western Europe,11 which is 
already threatening the Romanian economy with severe labour force 
shortages. All these internal problems create a significant challenge and 




The geostrategic position of Romania represents a real buffer zone 
between the East and the West. In this position, the tradition of 
“equilibrium politics” made Romania flexible and efficient and, often 
generating much better results than what the country’s actual 
capabilities would allow (Lakatos, 2015). The Romanian state, with the 
peace treaties that ended World War I, was placed in an essential 
geopolitical position with excellent power support: it “rounded off” and 
became militarily well protected, and the presence of the Black Sea was 
crucial to any anti-Russian effort. After the collapse of the USSR, this 
endeavour became obsolete at first glance, but geopolitical conflicts of 
interest proved to be much deeper than the ideological ones. The 
                                               
9 The GDP growth rate is above 3-4% since 2013 (it was 7% in 2017). 
10 E.g. The annual equivalised net income is just 3,000 € (which is the lowest in 
the EU) compared to the EU average of 17,000 € or the life expectancy at birth 
is 5 years lower than the EU average. 
11 There are more than 3 million Romanian citizens who are residents in the 
rest of the EU (2018). This value is the highest among the EU Member States. 
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enlargement of NATO and the EU was an excellent opportunity for 
Romania. Naturally, after the change of regime, Romania took a 
position in favour of the integration of the country into Western 
institutional systems. It pursued its foreign policy in such a way that it 
has never lost sight of its national interests. As a result of domestic and 
foreign policy efforts, as of January 1, 2007, the country’s integration 
objectives were achieved. 
Romania’s geopolitical situation continues to be very favourable 
and increasingly appreciated. As a result of the deterioration of Turkish–
Euro-Atlantic relations and the appreciation of the country’s regional 
role, it can gradually reach a similarly important role as that of Turkey 
in the Black Sea region. Moreover, Romania may be an important transit 
country of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea region. However, the 
future of the country can be undermined by internal social and political 
problems, and the fact that should an actual armed conflict between 
NATO and Russia occur, Romania will undoubtedly be among the first 
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Geopolitics and Environmental Consequences of Water 
Scarcity in the Peripheries of China and India 
Ádám Róma 
 
Southwest China and Northern India meet along their contested 
borders in one of the most unique geographical regions on Earth. The 
Hindu Kush Himalayan Region can be considered worthy of study from 
multiple viewpoints, due to its environmental importance and the 
severe threat it faces from climate change (the region itself is often 
referred to as the “Third Pole”) and the numerous interstate conflicts 
hitting the area, also affecting the various ethnic groups living on these 
peripheral and inhospitable territories. Besides commercial exploitation 
and the rapid growth of tourism, the political-military reality of the 
region and its environmental impacts are rarely mentioned. The region 
hosts a number of border disputes and political problems: the India-
Pakistan Wars and dispute over Kashmir, the China-India border conflict 
and War of 1962 in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, and the India-
Bangladesh dispute over the management of the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra rivers’ flows (Ives, 1987). Owing to these conflicts, the 
region has become heavily militarised through troops, roads, airports, 
barracks, and hospitals. This has placed great pressure on the 
ecosystem, resulting in deforestation, landslides, glacial retreat, clashes 
with wildlife, and the displacement of local ethnic groups. However, 
from an ethnographic perspective, the sub-Himalayan area is not only a 
barrier between the riverine communities of India and China but also a 
contact zone between the peripheral civilizations of Inner Asia (Zou & 
Kumar, 2011, p. 141). 
In the last twenty years, the degradation has further increased 
against the backdrop of politically motivated large-scale mine and 
hydro-electric dam construction, as the Chinese and Indian central 
governments are aiming to further solidify state control and integrate 
these fringe areas into their national economies, through encouraging 
immigration and upgrading the transport network and infrastructure. In 
this process, the various local ethnic groups living on the peripheries of 
the two largest Asian countries are sidelined despite the fact that these 
groups are the worst affected by the geopolitical conflicts and the 
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increasingly precarious environmental degradation. While the China-
India military standoff on the Doklam plateau in 2017 drew attention to 
the possibility of war between the two nuclear powers, the China-India 
competition on the Himalayan border and other conflicts are more 
likely to end in a slow-moving environmental catastrophe than in a 
quick nuclear disaster (Gamble, 2018).  
Regarding the Chinese and Indian dam building activities and the 
key considerations in political decision-making on the water resources 
found here, the narrative is dominated by a geopolitical perspective: the 
Himalayan “dam rush” is underlined by a potential resource conflict 
between China and India against the backdrop of their territorial 
sovereignty issues, irrespective of the environmental degradation this 
causes (Vidal, 2013; Sudha, 2015; Tenzin, 2015; Pak, 2016; Rahman, 
2016; Lovelle, 2016; Liu, 2015; Chellaney, 2015, 2018; Gamble, 2018). 
This geopolitical narrative is based on the recent re-evaluation of the 
importance of water, brought about by soaring demand for water 
following the surge of global population, putting water supplies under 
stress from this demand and by the consequences of climate change. 
With the arrival of the Anthropocene12, Earth’s freshwater supplies are 
one of the most affected by human activity. The growing water scarcity 
led to such names for water as the “oil of the 21st century”, symbolising 
the newfound potential of water resources to reorder international 
relations, and that its scarcity could cause international and domestic 
conflicts (Engelke, 2015). The two-fold aim of this paper is firstly to 
examine the basis of this perspective and either confirm it or challenge 
it, through an analysis of the context and effect of their extensive dam 
building activities on the peripheral areas of Tibet and Northeast India 
on three levels, and secondly, to shed light on the interplay of these 
levels of analysis, markedly affecting the livelihood of locals. 
Through these three levels – supranational, international, and sub-
national –, we explore distinct approaches to this phenomenon, 
examining the basis of the abovementioned narrative and also the 
effects of the two states” considerations and the severe environmental 
degradation on the local ethnic groups. The supranational level – if we 
                                               
12  Recognising the primacy of human activity in changing the Earth’s core 
processes (e.g. sediment flows or nitrogen cycle), starting from the familiar 
workings of the Holocene. 
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consider that climate change and the environmental consequences of 
human activities transcend national boundaries or interests13 – in this 
context denotes the Hindu Kush Himalayan region’s environmental role, 
effects, and the causes of its degradation, setting the geographical and 
environmental background for subsequent studies. The international 
level corresponds to the geopolitical perspective, including the 
background of China’s and India’s contention in the region, the related 
dam building process, and its political implications. The sub-national 
level deals with the numerous ethnicities living here from a critical 
perspective, focusing on their experience, as well as their possibilities 
and limitations in expressing their opinions on these issues. It must be 
noted that the slight imbalance in discussing some parts of the paper in 
favour of Indian developments is due to the difference in available 
sources relating to Chinese accounts of the topics considered.14 
 
The “Supranational”: Hindu Kush Himalayan Region 
 
The Hindu Kush Himalayan region extends over more than 3,500 
km covering areas of eight countries – Afghanistan,15 Bangladesh and its 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bhutan, South and Southwest China, 16  West 
Bengal and the eleven mountain states of India, states of Myanmar, 
Nepal, and parts of Pakistan17 – and it is the source of ten major Asian 
river systems: the Amu Darya, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra (Yarlung 
Tsangpo, 雅鲁藏布江), Irrawaddy, Salween (Nùjiāng,怒江), Mekong 
(Láncāng, 澜沧), Yangtze (Chángjiāng, 长江), Yellow River (Huánghé, 黄
河) and Tarim (Tǎlǐmù, 塔里木) (ICIMOD). The mountainous HKH region 
                                               
13 According to the Merriam-Webster definition of “supranational”.  
14  This is true even if we consider Chinese language sources, inasmuch as 
various search queries with Baidu (百度) resulted in few relevant writings, 
using the following keywords in various combinations: Xīzàng, 西藏 (Tibet), 
Huánjìng èhuà, 环境恶化 (environmental degradation), Zàngzú zhǒngzú, 藏族
种族 (Tibetan ethnicities), Shuǐdiànzhàn dà bà, 水电站大坝 (hydroelectric 
dam). 
15 Except the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat. 
16 Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai. 
17  North Western Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
Northern Areas, Baluchistan, Ajad Jammu and Kashmir.  
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with steep elevation possesses a diverse ecosystem, from high-altitude 
alluvial grasslands through subtropical broad-leaf forests and conifer 
forests to alpine meadows. The Himalayas drive Asia’s hydrological 
cycle, the diverse weather and climate patterns as well as trigger the 
summer monsoons. In winter, the region serves as the second largest 
heat sink in the world, while in summer, it draws the monsoon currents 
to the Asian hinterland. The 18,000 high-altitude glaciers in these 
mountains are considered one of the biggest freshwater reserves on the 
globe (Chellaney, 2018). 
The HKH region contains 488 protected areas across the eight 
countries with highly diverse and rich gene pools; out of the 34 global 
hotspots of biodiversity, four are located here (Sandhu & Sandhu, 2014, 
p. 297). This region also plays a crucial role in influencing the Northern 
Hemisphere’s atmospheric circulation system, through transporting 
warm air currents from the Equator to the North and South Poles 
(Chellaney, 2018). The region is aptly called the “Third Pole” as the 
largest contiguous layer of ice outside the Arctic and Antarctic is located 
here (Qiu, 2014, p. 240). 
However, due to climate change and other local human activities, 
the Himalayan region faces accelerated glacial thaw, coupled with 
climatic instability and biodiversity loss. Five out of the world’s ten most 
endangered rivers originate from here: Yangtze, Indus, Mekong, 
Salween, and Ganges. Besides climate change, various local human 
activities are accountable for the constant increase of the annual 
average temperature, which is three times more than the global 
average (Chellaney, 2018). Deforestation and the exploitation of natural 
resources, inter-river and inter-basin water transfer, the growing 
market of glacial water for the bottled water industry, pollution related 
to mining and dam construction, among others, all contribute to the 
environmental degradation of the HKH region.  
The environmental threats facing the Himalayan region have been 
in the focus of attention of researchers, conservationists and the writers 
of development policies since the second half of the 20th century (Blaikie 
& Muldavin, 2004, p. 521). Initially, the so-called “Theory of Himalayan 
Environmental Degradation” (THED) was the dominant narrative, which 
outlined an eight-point scenario leading to the environmental and 
socioeconomic collapse of the region by the millennium. Upon closer 
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scrutiny, the Theory, which made the local farmers scapegoats for 
environmental degradation, proved to be an oversimplified myth (Ives, 
1987), to the point that since the post-structural paradigm change, the 
former scapegoats – the local farmers – are, in fact, often considered a 
major part of the solution to the problem (Blaikie & Muldavin, 2004, p. 
522). However, despite the shortcomings of the THED, the 
environmental crisis threatening the Hindu Kush Himalayan region is a 
real consequence of human interference and activity. The region 
experiences declined precipitation, drought, deforestation, decreased 
farmland productivity, and natural calamities worse than the global 
mean (Tan, Zuo, Hugo, 2013, p. 83-84). The importance and the severity 
of the issue is further underlined by the crucial role of the Himalayas, 
which is responsible for generating the monsoons and the seasonal ice 
melting feeding the rivers in the region, which directly affects the 
livelihood of half of the world’s population and 20 percent of the global 
economy (Gamble, 2018). 
According to a comprehensive environmental assessment by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, the region has been getting hotter, 
wetter and more polluted. Precipitation in the region has increased by 
12 percent compared to 1960, with an average of 0.4°C growth of 
average temperature every decade. Due to rising temperatures, the 
glaciers are shrinking, and one-tenth of the permafrost cover is already 
gone. The thawing is also responsible for the 14-percent growth in the 
number of lakes since 1970, and for the expansion of these lakes’ 
surfaces by 86 percent. These changes affect not only the ice cover, but 
also the vegetation cover. The different surfaces, such as snow, 
grassland, or desert, absorb different amounts of solar radiation, thus 
determining the temperature of the air above the various surfaces. The 
changes in the coverage affect the onset and strength of the monsoons, 
consequently endangering downstream river communities with 
increasingly devastating floods. Based on current trends, the more 
optimistic estimates project a 1.7°C growth in average temperature by 
2100, while according to the worst-case scenario, this growth could be 
as high as 4.6°C. The already mentioned increase in human activities is 
tied to growing population: e.g. in 2012, 8.8 million people lived on the 
Tibetan Plateau alone, a three-fold increase compared to the 
population levels in 1951. The growing population is closely tied to 
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urbanisation, which also results in the growing amount of human waste 
produced, accompanied with waste produced by mining. It must be 
noted, that besides the local sources of environmental degradation, the 
dust, black carbon, and heavy metals blown in from Africa, Europe, and 
Asia all negatively contribute to the environmental damages of the 
Tibetan Plateau and the wider HKH region (Qiu, 2014). 
 
Water Resources  
 
The consequences of large scale hydro-electric dam building on the 
region’s environment are also far reaching as the stream flow reduction 
caused by these results in declining biodiversity, and at the same time, 
leaves less water available for irrigation, decreasing crop yield in the 
process (Sandhu & Sandhu, 2014, p. 301). Despite these considerations, 
India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan are all considering building hydro-
dams, and the four hundred planned dams in total are expected to 
produce more than 160,000 MW of electricity. Meanwhile in China, 
there are plans for over a hundred dams on major rivers originating in 
Tibet, with 60 more under planning on the Mekong. Beijing is also 
financing dams in Pakistan, Laos, and Burma to supply domestic energy 
demand (Vidal, 2013). Out of the region’s countries, China and India are 
responsible for most of the dam projects, suffering from severe 
resource and groundwater shortages (Bawa et al., 2010).  
The growing problem of water scarcity in part results from the 
populations of the two countries: although China’s population (1.39 
billion) exceeds that of India’s (1.33 billion), in the coming decades, the 
latter is to become the most populous country overtaking China. These 
large populations result in growing environmental exploitation and 
water consumption. Despite the heavy rainfalls of the Indian monsoon 
season, the lack of ability to store this water caused considerable 
problems, while most of the water supply – around 90% – is consumed 
by the agricultural sector. Thus, the effects of climate change – e.g. 
deterioration in monsoon intensity and frequency leading to unstable 
agricultural production and food security – further exacerbate the 
consequences of poor surface water storage capacity.  
On the other hand, China’s capacity is more than ten times that of 
India’s. However, the uneven distribution of China’s water sources 
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(glaciers, ground waters, and surface waters) results in serious water 
scarcity issues in certain regions; for example, North China only receives 
20% of the total rainfall and ice melting. Similarly, to India, Chinese 
agriculture also utilizes most of the available waters (around 70%), 
while another one-fifth is consumed by the coal industry. The 
considerable subsidies allocated for water also result in its 
undervaluation and overuse, disincentivising water-saving (Lovelle, 
2016, pp. 3-4). In this context, the Brahmaputra river’s potential in 
hydro-power generation becomes crucial as the possible subject of a 
Chinese - Indian resource conflict.  
 
The International Level: Geopolitics of Sino-Indian Relations 
 
The two Asian giants, the Republic of India and the People’s 
Republic of China have gone through profound changes and 
developments since their respective foundations in 1947 and 1949. Due 
to the economic reform process – starting from the end of the 1970s in 
China 18  and the beginning of the 1990s in India – both countries, 
although at different paces, started on the path of economic 
development with their integration into the US-led international liberal 
economic system. As a result, the two countries’ economies surged, 
coming closer to their historically significant sizes and roles of the 
precolonial world, with China ranking at the first and India at the third 
place. Besides the results of the economic reforms, as mentioned 
earlier, the two most populated countries’ citizens constitute more than 
one-third that of the entire globe (World Bank, 2017a, b). The two 
countries’ relations are remarkable not only owing to the sizes of their 
economies and populations but also because of their proximity. This 
was underlined by Li Keqiang’s remarks during his visit to India, when 
he described the two countries’ relation as the “defining partnership of 
the 21st century” (Pandit & Parashar, 2012). 
However, successful developments and cooperation in bilateral 
issues and in multilateral organisations, such as the BRICS or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are hampered by several 
issues. One of these issues is the disputed nature of their shared border 
                                               
18 Called the“reform and opening” (gǎigé kāifàng, 改革开放). 
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overshadowing their relations since the China-India War of 1962, 
according to the traditional narratives, caused by Chinese irredentism 
and betrayal from the Indian perspective, while China blamed Nehru’s 
Forward Policy and the manifestation of its “imperialist tendencies” 
inherited from the British (according to the official narrative, reflected 
on Baike 百科). Other problems are the Chinese concerns on the Dalai 
Lama’s and the Tibetan government-in-exile’s presence in the Indian 
city of Dharamshala, while India looks at the unbalanced bilateral trade 
and the recent growth of China’s presence and influence in South Asia 
warily. 
The cause of the War of 1962 between India and China was their 
differing perceptions of the two newly emerged countries’ borders after 
a chaotic civil war and independence accompanied by the scars left by 
the partition of the subcontinent. While Mao wanted to restore the 
borders of the Qing dynasty, Nehru pushed to consolidate the 
territories of the late British Raj (Muratbekova, 2017). The shared 
China-India border is usually separated into three sections. The first is 
the Eastern Sector, “delimited” by the infamous McMahon Line 
(Màikèmǎhóng xiàn, 麦克马洪线), where India controls the area as the 
state of Arunachal Pradesh spread over 90,000 km2, but this area is 
disputed by China, which claims the area under the name “South Tibet”. 
This Sector is followed by the Central Sector, where mostly smaller 
areas and passes are the subject of dispute, covering 2000 km2. In the 
third Western Sector, the dispute is over the Chinese-controlled Aksai 
Chin, as India regards the 33,500 km2 desolate area a part of India’s 
Jammu and Kashmir (Zhang & Li, 2013). 
The presence of the two central governments started with the 
region’s militarisation during the build-up to the war and was 
consolidated with establishing the line of actual control (LAC), signalling 
the status quo between them (Gamble, 2019, p. 45). Since the war, 
there have been several border incidents along the dreary Himalayan 
borders, continuing until today despite the historical 1988 Summit 
between Rajiv Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping. Although steps have been 
taken to solve the border dispute and normalise their relations through 
various confidence-building measures against the backdrop of growing 
bilateral trade, the effect of these are questionable at best, 
demonstrated by border incidents even in the 21st century. The latest 
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incident, resulting in military mobilisation from both sides, was the 
military standoff on the Doklam plateau, near the Bhutan-India-China 
trijunction point. A Chinese attempt to build a road on disputed 
territory led to an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation lasting two and a 
half months in the summer of 2017 (Róma, 2018). 
 
China and India: Water Sharing or Water Conflict? 
 
As China and India consolidated their control in the Himalayas, they 
continued the tradition of hydraulic manipulation of their imperial 
predecessors, heavily investing into technologies aiming to regulate 
rivers and water flows, maintaining the inherited infrastructures and 
building new dams with the help of the two superpowers, the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. This process outlasted the dam failures (caused by the 
low-quality construction of these dams) and the international change in 
attitudes towards large scale hydro-electric dams, with their respective 
dam building activity finally reaching the upper Brahmaputra basin by 
the millennium (Gamble, 2019, p. 45). The Brahmaputra is a trans-
boundary river, originating in Tibet, China, where it is called Yarlung 
Tsangpo. The river enters Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast of India 
as the Brahmaputra, then under the name Jamuna, enters the Bay of 
Bengal through Bangladesh (Tenzin, 2015). The river’s total length is 
2880 km long, with a drainage area of nearly six hundred thousand km2 
(Rahman, 2016). But the river is also ill-suited to dam building, due to 
its trans-boundary nature, crossing four countries, each dependent on 
its waters, coupled with the river basin’s seismic instability and heavy 
rainfalls with high seasonal variations (Gamble, 2019, p. 43). 
Despite dam collapses and subsequent casualties suffered both by 
China and India in the ‘60s and ‘70s, the dam building has continued. 
The Chinese economic system, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
(Zhōngguó tèsè de shèhuìzhǔyì, 中国特色的社会主义), where political 
and financial actors closely cooperate in key sectors (e.g. energy sector), 
resembling state-managed capitalism, is extremely effective in swiftly 
carrying out these projects, underlined by a centralised and strategic 
considerations. In India, while the state supports dam building through 
favourable policies and financial support (Nehru famously called large 
dams the “temples of resurgent India”), due to the decentralised nature 
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of its political system, which requires the participation of state 
governments in these projects, the outcomes are more diverse. The 
hydro-power sectors in both countries received further support with 
their inclusion in the international Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which subsidises dam building as a carbon alternative, 
disregarding the methane emission from the reserves, the disruption of 
the ecosystem, and biodiversity loss. The work and resources carried 
out and used by both governments are well-demonstrated by immense 
projects such as the Chinese Three Gorges Dam (SānxiáDàbà, 三峡大坝
) opened in 2004, or the Indian Narmada-River Dam, operational since 
2017 (Gamble, 2019, p. 56-57). 
The fear of a China-India resource conflict has been present since 
2000, when a natural dam burst in Tibet resulted in 30 deaths and 
severe infrastructure damages in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. 
Although it was suggested that the dam burst was intentional, satellite 
imagery showed natural causes. Nevertheless, in 2002, the two sides 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the share of 
hydrological information during monsoon season, which has been 
discontinued since the 1962 Sino-Indian War (it must be noted that 
during the Doklam crisis, it was temporarily suspended again). In 2008, 
the Chinese government announced the Zangmu (藏木) hydro-electric 
dam, raising fears of a major water diversion project, which could 
potentially dry up the Brahmaputra. These fears were further fuelled by 
the Chinese refusal to share information on the project. For these 
reasons, the topic became the priority in bilateral exchanges. By the 
time the dam became operational in 2015, the issue died down due to 
repeated Chinese reassurances, and a more extensive data sharing 
process was implemented. Nonetheless, New Delhi is suspicious of 
Chinese dam building projects and its Western Water Diversion plan, 
which supposedly aims to deliver water from the South to the more arid 
North. The extensive Chinese dam system would, in theory, allow the 
upstream China to “turn off the tap” on more than 30 percent of India’s 
water resource, however, it has been confirmed that the Chinese dams 
are so-called run-of-the-river dams, which do not require the storage of 
water, and the water diversion plan has been abandoned by Beijing due 
to the costs and environmental damages involved. Furthermore, any 
control over the Yarlung Tsangpo would be limited, as 70 percent of the 
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Brahmaputra’s water originates in India (but as this rainfall is 
concentrated in the monsoon seasons, the stability of the 
Brahmaputra’s river flows would still be affected by changes made in 
the upstream China) (Zhao & Su, 2015; Tenzin, 2015). 
Indian plans for large scale dam construction in the northeastern 
region are, in part, motivated by the abovementioned fears of a “water 
war” with China, and, at the same, India uses these plans to further 
consolidate state control in a region also claimed as “South Tibet”. 
Furthermore, Indian strategists argue that as India builds more dams, 
the water demand for these projects would be recognised under 
international law, thus preventing China from building more dams 
(Gamble, 2018). In India, there are agreements and memorandums of 
understanding on 168 large projects (with a 63,000 MW capacity) 
(Chowdhury, 2013, p. 196), but the completion of these projects are 
questionable, due to reasons presented in the following part. 
Meanwhile, China is also continuing its projects, with a proposed 
additional 60,000 MW hydropower development in Southwest China, 
according to the latest Five-Year Plan (中华人民共和国国民经济和社
会发展第十三个五年规划, 2016-2020). 
 
The Sub-National Level: The Context and Effects of Dam 
Building on the Peripheries 
 
The peripheral nature of the Brahmaputra basin was reflected in 
both Nehru’s and Mao’s approaches to this region, consequently the 
two nations’ attitude toward the numerous ethnic groups in this region 
were similarly characterised by paternalistic tendencies, containing 
both anti-imperialist narratives and colonial practices, categorising the 
locals as “backward” ethnic groups in need of development (Gamble, 
2019). This “regional discursive formation” still overwhelms national-
popular imagination, with the labels of “resource rich” and “backward” 
permanently attached to the regions, where the role of megadam 
projects also doubles as a homogenising “development machine”. The 
development policies largely disregard the local people, ethnicity, 
culture, and geography, resulting in manifold problems (Chowdhury, 
2013, p. 199). The environmental change and degradation in the Hindu 
Kush Himalayan region, besides natural phenomena, such as pollution, 
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flooding, and earthquakes, also leads to state intervention in the form 
of environment-related resettlement of people. One reason of 
displacement is the development of hydro-electric dams, 
disproportionately affecting already marginalised populations both in 
India and China, while failures to re-establish the livelihood of the 
displaced also causes discontent (Tan, 2013: 80; Dukpa, 2018; 
Chowdhury, 2013: 196). 
The Tibetan Plateau is predominantly inhabited by Tibetans, 
followed by Hans and other non-Han minorities, such as Lisus, Naxis, 
Bais, Yis, or Huis (Hillman, 2010). In China, local protests against the 
dams has been long muted; nevertheless, the fact that dams have been 
added to the list of prohibited topics reflects existing tensions regarding 
the issue (Gamble, 2019, p. 46). According to anecdotal evidence, while 
locals on the Tibetan Plateau are supportive of housing and income 
improvements, large scale development projects (such as hydro-electric 
dams) are mostly rejected. In the adjourning areas of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), such as Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, and 
Qinghai, locals organised protests against dam constructions on the 
Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween rivers, however, similar actions against 
planned projects on the upper Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo) are 
not possible due to the strict security and control measures introduced 
in Tibet following the 2008 uprising (Gamble, 2019, p. 60). 
The Northeast of India compromises the eight “sisters” of Assam, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland, 
and Sikkim, hosting approximately 220 ethnic communities and even 
more dialects, resulting from continuous migration flows throughout 
history (Jain, 2016, p. 275). The region is host to numerous conflicts as 
well, from armed oppositions or insurgencies with separatist 
undertones to violence against migrants and various protests. In this 
environment, the Armed Powers Special Powers Act (AFSPA), in effect 
since 1958, also provides a context to overreaching political activities in 
some parts of the Northeast. The Act does not only provide a legal 
framework of impunity to armed forces acting here, but also sustains a 
state of exception, allowing democracy to be permanently suspended 
in the so-called „disturbed regions”. This label is unilaterally decided by 
the central government, without any legal means to challenge it, 
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establishing de facto martial law in selected parts of the subcontinent 
(McDuie-Ra, 2009, p. 255). 
However, the various hydro-electric dams planned in the Northeast 
face setback regardless of governmental support and clearance, as 
private companies involved in the projects are losing interest. By 2009, 
there were 153 memorandums of understanding signed by Arunachal 
Pradesh with private companies, but work is yet to start, and the very 
same private actors are now asking the public sector to take over or set 
up joint ventures with them, questioning the future and smooth 
execution of the projects. This change of mind can be attributed to the 
lack of roads and power lines, the frequent outbreak of protests, 
constant delays, false community impact assessments, and most 
importantly, declining demand and falling price of electricity, making 
these projects less cost-effective and attractive (Rahman, A. P., 2016). 
 
Local Action in the Northeast of India – An Example 
 
The first dam building projects were envisaged by the Brahmaputra 
Flood Control Commission in 1955, aiming to provide irrigation and 
flood moderation in the region. The Brahmaputra Board then 
transferred the project to the National Hydroelectric Power 
Corporation (NHPS) in 2000 (Sharma, 2012). However, due to the lack 
of impact studies and assessments, the lack of an environmental 
compliance system and carrying capacity studies (Vidal, 2013), local 
uncertainty regarding the project’s social and ecological impact grew, 
and the All Assam Students Union (AASU) started to campaign against 
the megadams in 2002. As a result, a tripartite meeting was held in 2006 
between the AASU, the Assam Government, and the NHPS, which 
ended with the foundation of a scientific expert committee, tasked with 
the investigation of the project. Nevertheless, the NHPC started 
constructions without waiting for the downstream impact study by the 
scientific committee, which, in 2010, reported that the selected site for 
the project is “not appropriate” as the region is geologically and 
seismologically sensitive (Sharma, 2012).  
Due to the case of the Chinese Three Gorges dam and the Indian 
Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada river displacing tens of millions of 
people (Vidal, 2013), the heavy flood engulfing the habitat of 300,000 
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people in 2008 after the load waters were released from the dam in 
Ranganadi, and the burial of farmland on thousands of hectares by the 
changing course of the Gai river, protests continued in 2012 (Sharma, 
2012). Despite these developments, a 1750 MW project on the river 
Lohit has received clearance by the Committee of National Board of 
Wildlife. The 124-meter-high dam is opposed by conservationists on the 
grounds that it is extremely close to a Hindu pilgrimage site called the 
Parshuram Kund, and threatens numerous internationally recognised 




In our paper, we have looked at the context of Chinese and Indian 
hydro-electric dam building from three separate perspectives to 
examine the basis of the dominating narrative, depicting this process as 
a geopolitical competition over water resources without wider 
environmental considerations, motivated by its scarcity, and also taking 
into account the experience of the locals on the sub-national level, who 
are the ones ultimately affected by developments identified in the other 
two levels of analysis.  
Regarding the supranational level of our enquiry, we have 
established the importance of the wider environment of the Hindu Kush 
Himalaya region, where the dams are being built. The environmental 
degradation here poses a vital challenge, affecting not just locals but 
the entire globe. If the current trends continue, thawing glaciers, 
changing vegetation covers, and pollution would increase average 
temperatures by nearly five degrees by the end of the century, 
however, the devastating effects of floods, earthquakes, and erosion 
could result in irreversible consequences well before that time. The 
international level looked at the underlying geopolitical tensions 
between China and India, where water has become another question of 
contention. Periodical border incidents show the relevance of this 
viewpoint, which has also contributed to Indian fears of water conflicts 
as China is using waterflow data sharing mechanisms and possible 
diversion projects to put pressure on India. Expanding to the sub-
national level, we have found some similarities, especially in terms of 
the conceptualisation of and discourse over these regions by the central 
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authorities, where hegemonic attitudes are still present in their 
respective development policies. While there is a marked difference 
between Indian and Chinese locals’ ability to voice their concerns, there 
are constraining political-security factors on both sides, and the more 
visible rejection of these projects rarely brings positive results from the 
protesters’ point of view. 
As we can see, even if there are relevant considerations and 
significant effects identified on the supranational and sub-national 
levels, signalling the need for cooperation to solve these issues, political 
conflicts hinder the possibility of developing joint solutions. Decision-
makers prioritise security-related factors, trying to establish the 
presence of the central government on these fringe areas, concurrently 
aiming to strengthen their territorial claims and possessions. This view 
is also apparent when Indian strategists advocate the development of 
hydro-electric projects to secure recognition under international law, 
even though China has been known to disagree with rulings made by 
the International Court of Justice and suspended its water flow data 
sharing practices before to gain political leverage (Gamble, 2018). Due 
to the clear priority of sovereignty issues and power politics among the 
relevant actors equipped with adequate tools and resources to shape 
local and international developments, the use of a geopolitical 
perspective is undeniably relevant.  
However, there are multiple factors that prevent countries from 
engaging in warfare and interstate conflicts despite the geopolitical 
focus of most researchers of water conflicts, such as significant bilateral 
trade, the possibility of outside intervention or diplomatic pressure, 
making conflict less attractive (Moore & Walker, 2018). Consequently, 
joint action and cooperation in mutually important – and preferably 
depoliticised – issues could help to build trust between the parties, 
while increased transparency could further contribute to avoid 
”phantom problems” stemming from distrust and misunderstanding, 
which could derail constructive dialogues, escalate conflicts, and cause 
distractions (Tenzin, 2015). Furthermore, also on the level within 
governments, many actors play a role in formulating new 
environmental policies and use narratives about environmental damage 
and protection for their own purposes to reach goals unrelated to the 
environment. This is also practiced by the government to consolidate 
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power (Baranovich, 2016, p. 182). The locals, whose livelihood depends 
on the environment, are not only passive subjects of environmental 
change and state-led activities, (although taking actions against dam 
projects deemed detrimental to their situation), but they have also 
demonstrated an understanding of the ongoing climate change and 
shown a degree of adaptation towards the changed circumstances (Li, 
Tang, Luo, Di, Zhang, 2013). Encompassing all three levels of analysis, 
dam constructions should be heavily scrutinised before approval to 
avoid unnecessary environmental stress as well as mutual suspicion and 
misunderstanding feeding into narratives of regional competition and 
the inevitability of a Sino-Indian collision course, while at the same time, 
the actors involved in the planning of dam constructions should break 
away from the top-down planning of the “paternalistic state”, which, as 
Chowdhury (2013) put it, preliminary decides on the necessity of 
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Stuck Between Great Powers: The Myitsone Dilemma and 
the Challenge of the NLD Government 
Hnin Mya Thida 
 
Myanmar has occupied a geostrategic location between South Asia 
and Southeast Asia, and it has been exercising influence over abundant 
natural as well as human resources. It has been suggested that the 
country has the potential to be a major Southeast Asian player (MALIK, 
1997). It used to be a “sandwich state” between the two great powers 
of China and India, which engage in strategic rivalry in the region. The 
country’s geostrategic location represents a competitive ground for 
great powers to become a dominant in the region. Because of domestic 
instability as a result of a long-standing authoritarian regime, the 
development of the country has lagged behind other regional countries. 
Under the sanctions of the West introduced by the United States, it was 
the only way for Myanmar to extract its natural resources and China has 
been the main consumer of these exploited resources. The West has 
strongly condemned the military junta’s suppression of the 
democratisation movement and placed pressure on the regime by 
imposing economic sanctions. Consequently, China has become the 
only supporter and protector of the military junta in the international 
community. In 2011, the political picture of Myanmar changed when 
the military government turned over power to a civil government (semi-
civil government led by former military General Thein Sein). Following 
this process, immense policy changes have been taking place both in 
domestic and foreign policy alignment. 
 
The Political Picture of Myanmar in its External Relations 
 
Myanmar domestic affairs have also reflected its external relations, 
especially with the great powers of India, China, and the United States. 
Historically, Myanmar and China have shared a long history of relations. 
Myanmar is the first non-Communist country which recognised the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Han, 2017). The long-running civil 
war between ethnic armed groups and the Army has created a 
competitive ground between the United States and China.  
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Myanmar’s dependence on China was heightening for decades and 
reached a peak between the 1990s and 2000s as international sanctions 
were intensified and China was the only one remaining partner of the 
military regime. The situation of the two countries were similar at that 
time when both were excoriated by the international community for 
their brutal suppression of their own people during the Tiananmen 
Square incident in China in 1989 and the 1988 student uprising in 
Myanmar (Han, 2017). India, which has firm relations with Myanmar, 
but seriously condemned the military junta’s reaction to the 
democratisation movement, was the first and only Asian country to 
criticise the junta for its brutal suppression to the 1988 student uprising 
movement (Engh, 2016). From that time on, bilateral relations between 
India and Myanmar were rather strange until 1991. Politically, there 
was a longstanding regional rivalry between China and India for taking 
the leading role in the Asia–Pacific region. That situation pushed 
Myanmar closer to China and it strongly relied on China both for 
economic development and diplomatic protection, regarding which the 
military junta faced serious criticism and pressure by the West to have 
a more inclusive political process (Haacke, 2010).  
For China, Myanmar is the only country that could enable it to gain 
access to the Indian Ocean and it provides a possible solution to the so-
called Malacca dilemma (Mark & Zhang, 2017). In this case, Myanmar is 
also a transit state that can transfer the energy and natural resources 
from the Middle East and Africa and China’s exports to Europe. 
Moreover, Myanmar is an important market for poor-quality Chinese 
products and the outlet for China’s less developed Yunnan province 
(Myoe, 2015). Its abundance in natural resources has attracted China to 
satisfy its basic raw material needs required for its development. 
Chinese efforts to influence Myanmar heightened after the “Two Ocean 
Strategy” of China started to be implemented in 2005 with the aim of 
influencing both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and when 
China started the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013.  
Myanmar has adhered to and applied the “independence, active 
and non-aligned foreign policy” for decades. The country firmly 
maintained its non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War era. The 
government tries to keep close relations not only with China but also 
with other regional and global powers. In 2011, the Union Solidarity and 
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Development Party won the elections and Thein Sein, former Army 
General, became President. The remarkable year 2011 can be 
recognised as the “Myanmar Spring” with the peaceful democratic 
transaction from military rule to the first new civil government. The 
USDP government continued that foreign policy as well. Under the 
USDP government, three significant reforms – political reform, 
economic reform, and social reform – were planned and awaited 
implementation (Than, 2014). The elected government implemented 
both the domestic policy reforms and foreign policy realignment with 
the aim of reducing preponderant dependence on China and by 
initiating rapprochement with the West (Myoe, 2015). With the 
successful democratic reform, Myanmar’s foreign relations have 
profoundly changed with the rapprochement with the West. At the 
same time, the Obama Administration of the United States laid down 
the “Pivot to Asia” strategy with the purpose of containing the 
emergence of China by making closer ties with Asia–Pacific countries. 
Although the United States was dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
2010 election, which was neither free, nor fair and failed to meet the 
international accepted standards associated with legitimate elections, 
the Obama administration continued to use its dual-track strategy of 
engagement and sanctions vis-á-vis Myanmar (Kipgen, 2013). Hillary R. 
Clinton, Secretary of State of the US, visited Myanmar in December 
2011 and President Obama also visited Myanmar after 11 months of her 
visit and again in 2014 (Han, 2017). The Obama administration lifted a 
ban on humanitarian assistances to Myanmar and American 
investments in Myanmar as well (Hlaing, 2012). The United States 
introduced its new policy, a pragmatic engagement with the Myanmar 
government. The pragmatic policy of the United States caused serious 
concern in China as the Asian giant has suspected that US 
rapprochement with Myanmar means a political and security threat. On 
the other hand, China also hoped that US support to Myanmar would 
reduce the international condemnation of China for protecting the 
Myanmar military regime. For Myanmar, the USDP government wanted 
to reduce Chinese influence in its internal affairs both politically and 
economically and the government worried about the country becoming 
a pawn in the Sino–Indian competition (Clapp, 2010). It was a clear 
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evidence of the fact that both countries viewed Myanmar as their 
strategically important state.  
As for the United States, Myanmar is the strategic location from 
where it can watch the two major powers of Asia, that is India, and 
China. The United States’ policy shift and Myanmar’s foreign policy 
realignment met, and as a result, US-Myanmar relations were 
progressing at that time. The United States’ aim was to reinstate its 
power in the Asia-Pacific region and its positive engagement with 
Myanmar was not only targeted at containing the rise of China but also 
at establishing firm relations with the ASEAN. There are growing issues 
between some of the ASEAN countries and China concerning the South 
China Sea dispute. Therefore, the US’s return to Southeast Asia has 
seriously affected Chinese influence in the region. As ASEAN member 
countries they are not willing to take either sides as the perception is 
that the Sino–US rivalry maintains the balance of power in the region as 
well as it can contain assertive Chinese acts in the South China Sea. They 
want to maintain good relationships with both powers in order to 
continue trade with China, and at the same time, to be covered by the 
US military umbrella (Zhao, 2017). 
 
The Unites States’ Role in the Asia-Pacific Region and Sino–US 
cooperation in Myanmar’s Peace Process 
 
In 2009, the Obama Administration initiated the “Pivot to Asia” or 
“Rebalancing to Asia” concept in order to contain China’s emergence as 
the regional and global power moving its alignment away from the 
Middle East and Europe (Fly, 2018). The United States emphasized the 
stronger economic and political relations with regional countries as well 
as military cooperation by taking joint military exercises. Following this 
strategy, bilateral relations between the United States and Myanmar 
experienced a major shift from the sanctions regime to constructive re-
engagement. In 2010, bilateral relations were further strengthened 
after Myanmar had released the pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu 
Kyi (now State Counsellor and Foreign Minister of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar). Some economic sanctions were lifted as part of 
establishing better relations between the two countries and the US 
government allowed its business interests to invest in Myanmar. As for 
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Myanmar, the military leaders were willing to dwindle Chinese 
influence in internal affairs and over-dependence on China. In 2011, the 
first elected government led by President Thein Sein tried to re-
approach the West, especially the United States with the aim of 
reducing their dependency on China.    
Under President Hu Jintao’s government, Chinese foreign policy 
focused on building up China’s comprehensive national strength, which 
included three components: no conflict or confrontation, mutual 
respect for every country, and win-win cooperation (Zhao, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the United States’ strategy in Asia was to build its network 
alliances and partnerships with many of China’s neighbouring countries 
(Zhao, 2015). On January 22, 2014, the United States and China 
announced their cooperation in several areas in the 5th US-China–Asia 
Pacific Consultation. According to this cooperation, the two countries 
agreed to engage in future cooperation regarding Myanmar’s stability 
and development. Since 2011, US–China relations in Myanmar – based 
on their implications – are seen as competitive rather than cooperative. 
The United States mainly has focused on the promoting of democratic 
reforms and human rights, while China has been focusing on its 
economic benefits in its relations with Myanmar.  
Chinese fundamental interests in its relations with Myanmar are 
based on three factors, namely border stability, economic cooperation, 
and an energy transportation route (Sun, 2012). The great powers also 
had interest in the civil war in Myanmar which broke out between 
ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and the state Army. Both the United 
States and China was willing to act as mediators in the armed conflicts 
of Myanmar not for the sake of self-determination or to the benefit of 
the EAOs or the Army but for their own geopolitical advantages and 
national interests. China has played the role of the key mediator 
between the EAOs and the central government of Myanmar. Some 
powerful armed groups in the Eastern and Northern parts of the country 
has close ties with China in economic matters, especially border trade. 
They are located along the Myanmar–Chinese border which is why they 
cause great concern for China as a border security issue. Moreover, 
border trade between China and Myanmar is an important aspect for 
both countries, and thus it also became a factor of China’s involvement 
in this issue. 
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Myitsone Dam Project, U-turn Change in Myanmar, and the 
Challenge for the NLD Government 
 
The Ayeyarwady Myitsone Dam project is the largest dam 
construction in Myanmar, which is built on the confluence where the 
Mali Hka River and the N’Mai Hka River meet to become Ayeyarwady 
River. It is situated in Kachin State at the northern part of Myanmar. 
Myanmar people regard the Ayeyarwady River as the heart of the 
country, and it is the lifeline of the people of Myanmar. It is also the 
most useful river in the country, which originates in the snowy 
mountains of northern Myanmar and flows into the Andaman Sea. The 
project is a joint venture of the China Power Investment Corporation, 
Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power 1 (MOEP 1), and the domestic 
conglomerate of Asia World. The cost of the project is USD 3.6 billion, 
and it is the largest (6 GW) out of the seven dams to be built on the Mali, 
the N’Mai, and the Ayeyarwady rivers. It was started in 2009 and 
suspended under President Thein Sein’s administration due to the 
nationwide opposition in September 2011 (Chan, 2017).  
The year 2011 can be regarded as the period of the Myanmar 
Spring, in which the over fifty-year-long military rule was ended, and 
the peaceful democratic transaction was implemented. Thein Sein, 
former military General, became the first democratically elected 
president and 80% of the cabinet was occupied by Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP) members. It became the first government 
that paid attention to the voice of the people because the 
environmental and social impacts on the local people has been the main 
factor against the project. The unfair distribution of benefits (electrical 
power), moreover, was another cause why many people opposed the 
construction. In the distribution of electrical power, 90% is transferred 
to China and only the remaining 10% can be utilised by Myanmar. There 
are several anti-Myitsone dam movements led by environmentalists 
and activists. The “Save the Ayeyarwady Campaign” was the main 
movement to block the project.  
The Myitsone Dam project came to an end with the 17-year-long 
ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar Army and the KIO (Kachin 
Independence Organisation)-controlled armed group in 2001 (Chan, 
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2017). To maintain domestic stability and, at the same time, to draw in 
Western interests into Myanmar’s democratisation movement, the 
Thein Sein government announced the suspension of Myitsone Dam 
project without notifying China beforehand. Naypyidaw’s unilateral 
decision of repudiation of the project caused a serious shock in Beijing. 
It was the first step of Myanmar’s government towards reducing the 
overdependence on China by signalling Myanmar’s willingness to 
embark on a rapprochement with the United States. The unexpected U-
turn of Naypyidaw has also created dramatic political and diplomatic 
changes both in the internal and external relations of the country. 
Internally, societal actors were significantly strengthened to mobilise 
the people who showed eagerness to abrogate the Dam construction. 
People had the chance to stage peaceful demonstrations against the 
dam construction. On the other hand, strong opposition against ethnic 
armed groups in Kachin State raised the pressure on the government to 
suspend the project. Some argue that the Thein Sein government had 
no choice but to halt the dam building in order to avoid the more 
complex civil war that had begun after gaining independence in 1948.  
Lately, China has used the dam construction company as a tool of 
implementing its political aim, which can be labelled as the “Dam 
Diplomacy or Hydro Diplomacy” (Freeman, 2017). We can argue that 
China uses the “resilience network” meaning that the difficulties in one 
area do not weaken the whole structure of the bilateral relations 
(Lanteigne, 2017). On the one hand, the Chinese government did not 
want Myanmar to establish closer ties with the United States by forcing 
the country implement the dam project. China’s other motivation is that 
it will end up as a winner whether or not the project continues because, 
if it is cancelled, China receives compensation for it or it can claim to 
start a new project in its place.  Recently, in April 2019, prominent 
academic politicians, civil society leaders, and environmentalists 
announced the “One Dollar” campaign, in which panel discussions were 
aimed at representing the collective opinion of the Myanmar people, 
according to which they are ready to offer the necessary compensation 
by collecting one dollar from each citizen. The panellists then plan to 
send an open letter to President Xi Jinping (“Anti-Myitsone Campaign to 
Ask Citizens to Pay $1 Each to Compensate China”, 2019). The panel 
discussion was held in Yangon four days before the State Counsellor’s 
114 
scheduled departure to Beijing to attend the 2nd Belt and Road Forum. 
Although there have been a number of controversial issues about the 
campaign as the panellists did not mention exactly how they would 
collect the contributions from the public, it is clear that the panellists 
only suppose what the Myanmar people want. With regard to the 
cancellation of the Dam project, anti-Chinese sentiment has appeared 
in Myanmar. The government is in a struggle satisfying the will of its 
own people to repeal the project and, at the same time, the demand of 
the Chinese government to restart it. 
The current National League for Democracy (NLD) government led 
by Aung San Suu Kyi has not yet made any remarks on the issue as to 
whether the project should be resumed or terminated. The foreign 
policy of the NLD government is different from the previous USDP 
government but not completely new (Myoe, 2017). The government 
continues to apply the “independent, active, and non-aligned policy” 
which has been used for a long time. The obvious fact in the new 
government’s policy is that it focuses on people-to-people contacts as 
a diplomatic tool in foreign relations. The government is fully aware of 
the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries, particularly 
with China and of the avoidance of confrontation in any issue. In this 
situation, the people’s anxiety and criticism have increased as they feel 
dissatisfied with how the government addresses the issue.  
Under the NLD government, there were two reports proposed by a 
20-member commission concerning the Myitsone Project. The 
government did not publicly disclose the content of these reports. 
Moreover, the NLD government has been silent over the issue for a long 
time and has not yet reached an agreement with the Chinese 
government. In April 2019, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi attended 
the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in China and signed the two memorandums 
of understanding (MOU) and an agreement on the China–Myanmar 
Economic Corridor. However, there were no announcements made 
regarding discussion on the Myitsone issue, as it was expected by the 
people. The NLD government pursues silent diplomacy over the issue 
and it does not live up to the people’s hope. According to the present 
situation, we can suppose that the government might not have detailed 
or specific plans on how to solve the most controversial case. As for 
China, the failure of the Myitsone Dam project has seriously disrupted 
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China’s “Going out” investment strategy (Kiik, 2016). Besides, the 
unsettled dam dispute has also pointed out the collapse of China’s dam 
diplomacy used in small countries.  
Although the USDP government could explicitly decide on the 
suspension of the Dam construction as soon as the people claimed the 
cancellation to the project, the Chinese government did not force 
Myanmar to start the project. It was the USDP government at that time 
that could expect strong support by the United States to rebalance its 
foreign policy alignment. It could be said that Myanmar could manage 
its international relations, balancing between major powers and even 
creating a counterbalance to China against Chinese long-time 
hegemony. Myanmar was the centre of the power struggle of these 
major powers at that time. However, there were converse changes 
when President Donald Trump took in office in 2017 and US-Myanmar 
relations have been reduced since then. Under the Trump 
administration, American foreign policy has changed much in the wake 
of his campaign promise of “Make America Great Again”. Donald Trump 
tried to introduce American isolationism and strong nationalism, 
focusing on fighting against Chinese interests in the United States. 
Under the partisan issue and difference between the Democrats and 
Republicans, Myanmar has played a less important role in the US’s new 
foreign policy model, which totally changed with the Obama 
administration, and China is again the main player in Myanmar 
domestic politics without any disturbance. As a result, China has 
recently forced the incumbent NLD government of Myanmar to start 




Although both the United States and China try to enhance their 
influence over Myanmar, their main purposes are not completely the 
same: the US’s priority is to promote and export its human rights and 
democratic norms to the so-called Chinese client state (the Myanmar 
government has always rejected this label), while China has mainly 
focused on its economic interest. However, it is undeniable that both 
have strategic interests in Myanmar as part of the clashes between 
democracy and communism. It can be clearly seen that Myanmar 
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cannot manage the domestic instability by itself as it also depends on 
and is linked to strategic and economic interests of great powers, such 
as the United States and China. On the other hand, the long-standing 
civil war between the ethnic minorities and the army also allows the 
external powers to have a much chance of influencing Myanmar 
internal affairs. It is a critical issue for the Myanmar government to 
choose a possible strategy with respect to its relations with great 
powers. These strategies could either be a hedging strategy, balancing 
or bandwagoning, alliance, or neutralism. The NLD government has still 
not solved the Myitsone dilemma over half of its term and it is still a 
controversial and challenging issue for the government. The Myitsone 
Dam issue will be a sensitive case for the incumbent government, which 
is a key factor in whether or not it will be re-elected for the next term. 
To conclude, Myanmar might unfortunately and inevitably fall under 
the sphere of influence by China again. 
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The Fundamental Principle of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: 
The Balance of Power 
Renxin Wang 
 
The concept of the Balance of Power was originally established 
back in 17th-century Europe as an outcome of the Thirty Years’ War. 
When the House of Habsburg was defeated, a series of treaties were 
signed by the states that were involved, which is known as the Peace of 
Westphalia or the Treaties of Osnabruck and the Treaty of Munster. The 
Treaties of Westphalia have had an essential impact on the following 
global order, even up until now. The Treaties of Westphalia not only 
influenced the establishment of several nation-states in Europe, but 
also contributed to the creation of an important diplomatic strategy of 
the international relations, which became known as the Balance of 
Power. (Hassan, 2006) Since then, the Balance of Power has always 
been an integral part of the European political landscape. (Holsti, 2009) 
If we take a look at the two World Wars, the Cold War, and other 
significant political or military confrontations, the main reasons or 
causes of these conflicts are the vicious competition raised or proposed 
by the great powers of the world at the time. Regardless of whether it 
was a war, a conflict, a dispute, or even peace, the main push factor was 
the concept of the Balance of Power. The Balance of Power aims to 
prevent a state from playing a dominating role upon other states. This 
immediate power-balancing process limits great powers competitive 
advantage used to threaten other states in terms of national security, 
economy, capacities. The strategy of the Balance of Power is an 
approach of diplomacy that small countries usually choose to 
implement in the international order. Geographically peripheral 
countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam, and Singapore all choose the 
Balance of Power diplomacy in order to strive to maintain stability. For 
peripheral countries themselves, choosing the Balance of Power 
strategy allows their voices to be heard by great powers and also helps 
them to integrate into global affairs. 
As the author mentioned before, the Balance of Power is one of the 
most important concepts or implementations of the contemporary 
realist International Relations school, which can be considered as a very 
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practical foreign policy in the implementation of a realist foreign policy 
for many countries. Teles motioned in his own critical review on Wight, 
Martin’s Power Politics that the original meaning of the balance of 
power takes the idea of an equal distribution of power, in a context 
where no power is so dominant as to pose others risk. (Wight, 2002)The 
balance of power would be in full operation every time a dominant 
power strives to dominate international society and momentary means, 
disrupting this balance. (Teles, 2015) This means that the Balance of 
Power is more like a status where all the powers can equally compete 
with each other regardless of their state capacity in the fields of military, 
finance, and politics. In general, the Balance of Power is usually used to 
explain or describe the distribution of political powers or a particular 
approach of foreign policy as Hans Morgenthau concluded in his book 
Politics Among Nations about the Balance of Power, it is a policy aimed 
at seeking a special status that has an equal distribution of power status 
any type of approach of power distribution. (Morgenthau, 1990)  
In general, Singapore is a classic example of the implementation of 
the Balance of Power. The essence of the Balance of Power usually 
refers to a status or a relationship of balance and stability between 
states. The status of stability is usually initiated peacefully (Sun, 2014). 
This kind of status or relationship has been pursued by many countries 
or international communities throughout history, which is directly or 
indirectly reflected in their foreign policy and diplomacy. For example, 
the two World Wars were initially started with military competition 
between countries because if a country’s neighbors are much stronger, 
then the smaller state usually feels threatened. The imbalance of the 
regional order will initially cause competition or even confrontation in 
order to maintain the regional power balance. Since the Balance of 
Power is indeed a sort of competition in international affairs, it will 
always take the form of a circle of balance and imbalance with instant 
shift between these two statuses. Regardless of which approach or type 
of foreign policy a country pursues, the goal and outcome they pursue 
often results in the establishment of this Balance of Power system. 
Superpowers achieve this Balance of Power via the implementation of 
their global vision and dominance. But only few countries can 
implement this global strategy due to the lack of state competitiveness; 
such as Russia, China, and the United States, which all play a vital role 
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in global affairs to ensure their global leadership and dominance. For 
example.to mention the most recent example, China and the US always 
try to achieve a balance on the Korean Peninsula. If small and weak 
countries want to achieve their goals and protect their interests, they 
must maintain a certain stable relation with big powers. (Scalapino, 
1974)  
 
The Context of Singapore’s Power Balancing Strategy 
 
From the perspective of regional security and geopolitics, 
Southeast Asia has always been the region where the great power 
interests met. In the late ‘60s, the British Government decided to 
withdraw their military deployment in Singapore (Marsita & Chan, 
2009), and one year later, US President Nixon made a speech on the 
Vietnam War, which was considered as a new “Nixon Doctrine” (Editors, 
2009), which made the security situation of Singapore very 
unfavourable. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union proposed an Asian 
collective security policy, which was intended to change Southeast 
Asian security affairs. (MEDIANSKY & COURT, 1984).When Singapore 
was founded, the country had to face severe problems both 
internationally and domestically, which made Singapore’s government 
very cautious in dealing with issues at that time. Internationally, due to 
the cultural and other ties between Singapore and Mainland China, the 
neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia were 
traditionally afraid that their neighbour could become a new state 
which could potentially speak for China’s Communist Party. 
Domestically, before achieving independence, the majority of 
Singapore’s population were ethnic Chinese who were heavily 
influenced by their Chinese ancestry in terms of language and culture. 
But due to political reasons19, the majority of the Chinese had to live in 
a society dominated by Malay culture, and this caused many problems 
between Singapore and Malaysia before their separation. Meanwhile, 
Singapore still had a high unemployment rate after independence, and 
                                               
19 Before their independence, Singapore and Malaysia were British colonies. 
After Malaysia gained independence, Singapore became independent but only 
together with Malaysia. Because its cultural link with China, Singapore with its 
Chinese culture was not welcomed by the Malaysian government.  
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economically, Singapore was a region that heavily relied on Malaysia in 
areas in which it could not effectively operate as a state.  
The domestic and international atmosphere that Singapore was 
facing upon achieving independence determined the importance of the 
diplomacy of the Balance of Power. In 1965, Singapore was unwillingly 
separated20 from Malaysia, and had only 1.3 million inhabitants21 and 
only 580 square kilometres of territory. As soon as they gained 
independence, the survival of this new nation was seriously questioned. 
“Some countries were already independent, some countries fought for 
it, and Singapore’s independence was imposed on it.” (Lee, 1998) As Lee 
Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first Prime Minister wrote about his experience 
in many of his books, it never occurred to him in life that he would once 
be responsible for the lives of 2 million people and lead the country for 
decades afterwards. (Lee, From Third World to First: The Singapore 
Story: 1965-2000, 2000). Because of the population and size of the 
territory, Singapore was considered a small country after gaining 
independence. Small countries of the world often find it challenging to 
maintain their sovereignty and protect their interests without foreign 
support or influence. (Maass, 2009) If they cannot manage the situation 
well, a national tragedy might ensue. Singapore faces a similar problem, 
but it may be even worse. The geographical location of Singapore is 
situated in the Pacific. It is also an important commercial and 
transportation terminal in the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. 
This made Singapore a commercial, cultural, and geopolitical hub in the 
region. Therefore, for hundreds of years, many colonists attempted to 
either occupy or take advantage of Singapore to gain more benefits 
from the country. Thus, Singapore was not be able to avoid being 
involved in confrontation between the big powers.  
The instability and uncertainty of the foreign policies of Great 
Powers raised the tension between Singapore and Great Powers. In 
March 1973, Lee Kuan Yew addressed his concern about the Soviet 
expansion in Southeast Asia at a meeting by unrueing that major powers 
in the West should provide support by military means and protect the 
freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. This speech mainly targeted 
                                               
20  Singapore was not able to establish a country based on its economical 
capacity without Malaysia, it was only considered as a port for Malaysia. 
21 Singapore Population Growth, World Population Review 
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the Soviet Union. Lee Kuan Yew made another speech later that year in 
the United States, pointing out that the Soviet Union’s presence is 
strengthening so Singapore would like to see an increased US presence 
in the region. (Singapore, 1973) The way how Lee Kuan Yew made his 
speeches and the strategies he implemented made a clear statement to 
inviting big powers to compete in Southeast Asia in order to let 
Singapore benefit the most between the big powers’ competition in the 
region. This could be totally seeing as a perfect implementation of Lew 
Kuan Yew’s Balancing Strategy, by involving more competitors, Lee put 
the pressures both on Soviet Union and the U.S, so they may compete 
with each other to get Singapore’s support with its choke point location. 
This makes it possible for Singapore to combine all the powers in the 
region together, and this can put Singapore at a superior strategic 
position since all the big powers want to align with it, and to realize their 
strategic or security goals can be accomplished only if they cooperate 
with Singapore. Based on this, both Singapore and the U.S chose each 
other as the pillar of their diplomacy for the Balance of Power. 
However, the model of diplomacy that Singapore established, met 
a lot of common interests of small countries, which obviously 
challenged the stereotypes in traditional diplomacy for the small states. 
The Chinese international relations experts have a famous saying, which 
is “Weak countries have no diplomacy” (弱国无外交). It simply means 
that the small states can only choose to have objective diplomacy rather 
than a self-designed and subjective diplomacy when they are dealing 
with Great Powers. Singapore was one of the smallest countries in the 
world with nearly no natural resource reserves, even including water 
need to be imported from other countries. (Cai, 2000) Due to special 
ethnic relations, political, and historical background, Singapore was 
encircled by countries with which it had conflicts. As a result, Singapore 
faced huge pressure to survive and ensure its own security. Facing all 
these problems, Lee Kuan Yew made the fundamental diplomacy 
guideline, the Balance of Power diplomacy. 
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The Balance of Power and Non-Aligned Movement 
 
The idea of Non-Aligned Movements was promoted by some 
countries such as India, Egypt, and Indonesia after the World War 2. In 
the late 1960s, US President Nixon changed the U.S foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union; a move which amplified direct dialogue 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two great powers 
decided to ease their military and political confrontation. This directly 
provided a choice for the newly independent states and small states 
after the Second World War. Because the small states can be gathered 
together by not pledged to any Great Powers but supported by other 
small states. This third options after U.S and Soviet Union became really 
popular, some small countries considered this is the best way to avoid 
being forced into the confrontation between the great powers is to 
choose a neutral and non-aligned policy which is also their only option. 
Singapore believed that adopting a non-aligned approach is the 
only way to protect their interests for the emerging independent 
countries for their national security. This would not only ensure that 
small countries are not involved in a military confrontation between 
great powers, but they would also not be labelled as a member of any 
polar group, which is ideally suitable for Singapore. (Qie, 2005)The 
implementation of the non-alignment policy was not only conducive to 
avoiding the conflicts of great powers but also to achieving the goal of 
reducing the number of enemies and making a policy, which is based 
more on the friendly relations of developing countries. Good relations 
with neighbouring countries also contribute to the harmony of internal 
ethnic groups in Singapore. Therefore, shortly after Singapore achieved 
independence, the island nation announced its non-alignment policy 
and expressed its willingness to develop friendly relations with the vast 
majority of countries in the world. But at the same time, Lee Kuan Yew 
believed that non-alignment was not the perfect system the country 
needed. Singapore was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
declared its non-aligned stance since gaining independence, but 
Singapore had its own idea about the movement. “The content of the 
Non-Aligned Movement must now be reconsidered,” (Singapore N. A., 
1973) Lee said at a national banquet in 1973 to welcome the President 
of Yugoslavia. “The question for small countries is no longer how to 
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avoid being drawn into the poles of the great powers, but how to make 
them aware of their interests when they compromise with each other.” 
(Singapore N. A., 1973) In 1970, Singapore participated in the Third 
Summit of the Non-Aligned Government in Lusaka. After Singapore 
gained independence, Lee Kuan Yew realised that it was almost 
impossible to maintain a neutral position for Southeast Asia if great 
powers were excluded because no other country in the world had such 
an ability and power to ensure security in the region. He believed that 
after the retreat of the British Army, the order of Southeast Asia would 
be influenced mainly by the competition between the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China. (Qie, 2005) 
 
The Big Power Balancing Strategy and its Continuity 
 
During the last years of the Cold War, the majority of small 
countries chose to remain neutral and adopted for non-aligned 
diplomacy in order to avoid getting involved in the confrontation 
between the two poles – an idea that greatly inspired Lee Kuan Yew. He 
argued that, in order to survive in the complexities in geopolitical 
changes in South East Asia, small countries like Singapore has to make 
the Great Powers has to neutralize the South East Asia and prevent 
smaller countries as a tool for gaining their national interests. He hoped 
that Singapore would adopt a neutral status in the international order 
similarly to Switzerland, making it a neutral center, like the “Geneva” of 
Asia but not a protectorate of any other great power. (Qie, 2005) 
Back to 90s, the Bipolar System was collapsed because the Soviet 
Union collapsed. The international system and international order were 
decentralised later on and it was no longer controlled by one or two 
major powers because of the rise of other competitors on the global 
stage such as China. Although the United States lost some of its national 
capacity during the competition with the Soviet Union, but it 
undoubtedly survived as the only superpower in the world after the 
Cold War. In Southeast Asia, the US still dominated the region. But the 
regional order was still affected by countries like Russia and Inida; after 
experiencing decades of dysfunction, the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) was greatly improved in terms of 
organisational scale and organisational capacity. After the Cold War, 
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these major countries outside the region continued to hold major 
interests in Southeast Asia. Singapore, which is economically 
developed, politically stable, and geographically advantageous, has 
become an important partner to great powers to integrate into 
Southeast Asian issues, which gave Singapore an important role in the 
balancing of great powers. (Fu, 2016) 
Although the Founding Father Lee Kuan Yew resigned in 1990 and 
Gok Chok Tong became Prime Minister for a short while to maintain the 
sustainability of the previous policy, and right after Gok Chok Tong, his 
eldest son, Lee Hsien Loong came to power eventually, contemporary 
Singaporean Foreign Policy, in fact, remained mostly unchanged not 
only because Lee Kuan Yew had kept his political influence within the 
government for a while but also because Lee Hsien Loong drew many of 
his ideas from his father’s legacy. 
 
The Implementation of Great Power Balancing Strategy 
 
Balancing with the U.S  
 
After the Second World War, the United States kept its superpower 
status and a dominating role in global affairs. The United States was still 
the “indispensable nation”. Lee Kuan Yew argued that the United States 
was the key to maintain the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and only the presence of the United States in Southeast Asia could 
maintain peace in the region because other powers which have the 
ability to interfere in regional issues would always hesitate before they 
move. Therefore, Singapore should consider aligning very closely with 
United States both politically and militarily, since the US will be the 
stability factor in the Pacific region, and it is also the main partner for 
Singapore’s economic development. Before the US, Singapore’s 
national security was originally secured by Britain since the island nation 
had been one of the British colonies. However, when Britain announced 
that it would withdraw its military from Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew was 
appalled and devastated because Singapore clearly had no ability to 
develop a military on its own. (Omar & Chan, 2009) Singapore 
immediately started to welcome US military presence in the Southeast 
Asia. Likewise, Singapore and the United States signed a series of 
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military cooperation agreements to keep American troops in Southeast 
Asia and Singapore. In 1990, Singapore signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the United States to allow the US military to use 
Singapore’s military facilities. (Boon, 2015) After several years of 
cooperation, Singapore first participated in the US–Thailand Cobra 
Military Exercise in 2000. (Ministry of Defense, 2000) After 9/11, the 
political, military, and economic relations between the two states were 
further strengthened. Singapore strongly supports the anti-terrorism 
activities of the United States and the war of Iraq. Economically, 
Singapore also needs the US to counterbalance Japan’s growing 
influence. As for the United States, although Singapore has a population 
of only 3 million people, it has been playing a significant role in the 
exports to the United States, with bilateral trade worth billions of 
dollars every year. Singapore is an ideal market for US products and 
services. Singapore also hopes to promote its own prosperity through 
US investment and trade. 
Since the Obama Administration officially announced its policy of 
“Pivot to Asia”, the strategic focus of the US has shifted to the Asia-
Pacific region, similarly to the Trump administration’s policy. No matter 
if it is the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific, Singapore is the key to success. 
The differences and conflicts between China and the United States 
increased enormously in the 21st century. The United States views China 
as a global competitor and considers China’s diplomatic cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific region to be a move to break the regional power 
balance, which means that the US also intended to keep its military 
presence in Southeast Asia. In the military field, with Singapore’s active 
cooperation in keeping the Chinese Military out of Southeast Asia, the 
US military welcomed the fact that Singapore was buying US weapons 
and equipment. Regardless of whether if its Obama’s or Trump’s 
administration, we can see that the stability of the two countries’ 
foreign policies towards each other has never changed because they 
need each other both economically and militarily. 
 
Balancing with China. 
 
Lee Kuan Yew once said: “The stronger China is, the more balanced 
US–Soviet relations will be, and the more secure Singapore will be”. 
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(Koh, 2017) Lee Kuan Yew argued  that China would be successful in 
developing its economy and advocated to establish a good relationship 
with Southeast Asian countries eventually. But at that time, Indonesia 
and China was in confrontation. By considering the influence of the 
relations with its neighbours, Lee decided to wait until Malaysia and 
Indonesia both established diplomatic relations with China and 
Singapore would do so only after them. (Min, 2015) As a result, during 
the Cold War period, although there were no formal diplomatic 
relations between China and Singapore, they maintained good informal 
exchanges, and, of course, this mainly concerned trade. In the 
meantime, Lee Kuan Yew started to visit China frequently with a series 
of agreement were signed regarding economic cooperations. (Min, 
2015) By the end of the Cold War, Singapore became the fourth largest 
foreign investor in China and the fifth largest trade partner, and also 
one of the most important sources of foreign exchange reserve for 
China, since China’s economic development and Singapore played an 
important role in promoting the Chinese Reform and Opening up Policy. 
(Qie, 2005) 
In Singapore’s perspective of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, 
China has been a factor contributing to the balancing strategy of 
Singapore. From 1965 to 1974, the basic principle of Singapore’s policy 
regarding China was the separation of diplomatic relations and trade 
relations. Economically, Singapore actively engages in trade with China. 
Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Singapore’s trade with 
China was considered to be continuously stable. Singapore actively 
trades with China mainly because it was an important way for Singapore 
to survive economically, and Singaporeans are mainly ethnic Chinese 
who have played an important role in promoting trade with China. 
China was also willing to develop trade with Singapore as well. 
Politically, on the one hand, the Singaporean government recognises 
the People’s Republic of China and supported the restoration of China’s 
lawful status in the United Nations. On the other hand, it does not 
engage in political contact with China, not even establishing diplomatic 
relations with China because Singapore fears that Malaysia and 
Indonesia would not welcome Singapore having too close ties with 
China. Then Singapore’s policy towards China gradually developed with 
the, establishment of important political relations. After that, in 
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October 1990, Singapore’s policy towards China aimed at establishing 
formal diplomatic relations with China because most of the Southeast 
Asian countries had had already recognised Communist China. (WANG 
Linjing JIANG Lan, 2008) 
 
Involvement in the ASEAN 
 
The ASEAN is one of the most remarkable organisations that 
Southeast Asia has ever had: it was created in order to maintain national 
independence in the international order, where the United States and 
the Soviet Union compete for regional hegemony and to reduce the 
interference by the great powers in Southeast Asian countries. In 1967, 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines jointly 
issued the ASEAN Declaration during the official foundation of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bangkok, Thailand, declaring 
the formal establishment of a new regional alliance group. (ASEAN, 
2016)  
To some extent, the establishment of the ASEAN has united the 
strength of Southeast Asian countries, making them a single unit, rather 
than individual small countries. During the Cold War, the ASEAN mainly 
stood on the side of the western countries led by the United States to 
confront the communist activities in Southeast Asia. At the same time, 
the establishment of the ASEAN cooled down the tensions between 
Singapore and its neighbours. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union started to 
interfere in other countries’ internal affairs in Southeast Asia. Under this 
context, Singapore somehow pushed for the politicisation of the ASEAN. 
One example for this is when the Soviet Union supported the invasion 
of Cambodia by Vietnam, but Singapore condemned the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam in the United Nations and other platforms, representing 
the ASEAN, calling on the international community to respect the 
sovereignty of small states. After this, Singapore achieved its goal to 
raise its voice in the ASEAN and also made the ASEAN’s voice heard by 
other great powers.  
Currently, Singapore plays a vital role among ASEAN member states 
in terms of military capacity and state competitiveness. With 
considerable military power in Southeast Asia, Singapore’s power 





Implementing the Balance of Power made Singapore a successful 
model for small states. With tremendous economic achievements that 
Singapore has made in the past decades, the Balance of Power surely 
was the key to all these successes. The Singaporean leader Lee Kuan 
Yew’s analyse of the global affairs and context was significantly correct. 
There is no doubt that Singapore’s adjustment based different period 
and situations were mostly successful. This approach has made 
Singapore to avoid objective disasters that might have come alone 
under the Great Power dominate system.  
The world got used to a western power led international order. 
Small countries’ competitiveness was mostly depending on their 
economy, economy and foreign policy. As we have seen in the past few 
years, the request and needs of the small states were. Mostly neglected 
because the Great powers will serve their national interests first. But 
apparently, Singapore is not the best example for this. By transforming 
the country itself.  
Most of the small countries do not have the capacity to play a 
significant role in international affairs; rather, they can either obey or 
suffer the consequences. Fifty years ago, Singapore, a small and poor 
island was forced to become independent in the middle of the Pacific. 
Singapore developed from a small country into a big country in global 
affairs. At the diplomatic level, Singapore perfectly combined its own 
interests and those of great powers. Economically, through the 
establishment of close economic ties with western developed 
countries, such as the United States, Singapore quickly joined the club 
of developed countries. Singapore’s economic success has also driven 
regional economic and trade development in Southeast Asia. Militarily, 
Singapore strengthened military cooperation with the United States 
after the Cold War and used American power to ensure its national 
security. Politically, Singapore stands together with China to promote 
the Asian values against Western values of democracy. Singapore is a 
pragmatic country which always treats its national interests as a 
priority. For decades, Singapore has maintained good diplomatic 
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relations with the United States, Japan, China, and other major 
countries despite occasional diplomatic misunderstandings.  
Singapore’s strategy of great power balancing originates in the 
theory of balance of power. Obviously, Singapore cannot manipulate or 
influence the behaviour of a great power. What it can do is only to 
divide the influence of a great power in the region with the help of the 
international system and international organisations. At the same time, 
it asserts its interests with major countries and builds close bilateral 
relations with the great powers, which can be considered a quasi-
alliance. Singapore has promoted the idea of great power balancing in 
the ASEAN, making it a strategy for the ASEAN to handle relations with 
other great powers. 
However, Singapore’s great power balancing strategy also faces 
many challenges and uncertainty. On the one hand, Singapore’s power 
balancing strategy now relies more and more on the ASEAN. On 
December 31, 2015, the ASEAN announced the community declaration, 
which is another historic leap forward in the development of ASEAN 
integration. However, learning from the EU, the ASEAN is still a loose 
union, and the national sovereignty and independence of each country 
within the organisation are far less powerful than in the EU. On the 
other hand, Singapore’s strategy of balancing great powers is based on 
the balance of regional powers. As the balance of power between major 
countries changes, the trend of the future world may upset the balance 
of power. Once the foundation of great power balance disappears, the 
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